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In its landmark order on provisional measures in Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The
Gambia v. Myanmar) (The Gambia v. Myanmar), the International Court of
Justice (ICJ, or the Court) held that The Gambia had prima facie standing
before the Court based solely on the erga omnes partes nature of the
obligations it sought to enforce.1 Citing its advisory opinion in Reservations
to the Genocide Convention, the Court reasoned:
[A]ll the States parties to the Genocide Convention have a
common interest to ensure that acts of genocide are prevented and
that, if they occur, their authors do not enjoy impunity. That

The authors are associates at Debevoise & Plimpton LLP. The views expressed herein are
the authors’ personal views and should not be attributed to their firm or its clients.


1.
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(The Gam. v. Myan.), Order, 2020 I.C.J. 1, ¶ 31 (Jan. 23).
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common interest implies that the obligations in question are owed
by any State party to all the other States parties to the Convention.2

The Court first recognized erga omnes obligations in Barcelona
Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain) (Barcelona Traction),
when it explained that there are two categories of obligations under public
international law: “obligations of a State towards the international
community as a whole,” and “those arising vis-à-vis another State.”3 For the
former, the Court explained that “[i]n view of the importance of the rights
involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection;
they are obligations erga omnes.”4 According to the Court, such obligations
include the prohibitions on aggression and genocide, as well as the obligation
to respect “the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human
person, including protection from slavery and racial discrimination.”5
The Court later recognized the related concept of obligations erga
omnes partes—obligations that a State owes to a group of other States with
a common interest, such as other State parties to a multilateral convention.6
In Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium
v. Senegal) (Belgium v. Senegal), the Court held that the State parties to
the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) have a “common interest”
in ensuring compliance with certain obligations under the convention,
and as such, obligations “are owed by any State party to all the other States
The International Law Commission’s
parties to the Convention.”7
Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts similarly recognize both obligations “owed to a group
of States” and “owed to the international community as a whole.”8
Before The Gambia’s case against Myanmar, the Court had never
considered an application alleging violations of obligations erga omnes

2.

Id. ¶ 41.

3.
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), Judgment (Second Phase),
1970 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 33 (Feb. 5).
4.

Id.

5.
Id. ¶ 34; Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 23 (May 28).
6.

Belg. v. Spain, 1970 I.C.J., ¶ 33.

7.
Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Sen.), Judgment,
2012 I.C.J., ¶ 68 (July 20).
8.
Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at 29
(2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 31, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2).
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partes by a State that did not assert any special interest in the dispute.9 The
closest it had previously come to doing so was in Belgium v. Senegal, where
the Court found no need to address Belgium’s asserted special interest since
“any State party to the Convention [against Torture] may invoke the
responsibility of another State party with a view to ascertaining the alleged
failure to comply with its obligations erga omnes partes . . .”10 Otherwise, it
reasoned, “[i]f a special interest were required [to bring a claim], in many
cases no State would be in the position to make such a claim.”11 The ICJ
confirmed this position in The Gambia v. Myanmar.12 Although the ICJ only
found standing on a prima facie basis, the order may open the door to
increasing claims asserting violations of treaty-based obligations, despite the
lack of a factual nexus between the applicant and the respondent with respect
to the legal controversy.13
The Court’s order in The Gambia v. Myanmar may create opportunities
for judicial intervention by the ICJ, even where other forms of international
intervention are elusive.14 For example, international efforts to hold the
Assad regime accountable for atrocities in the Syrian civil war have been
unsuccessful thus far.15 However, in September 2020, the Netherlands
announced that it had sent a diplomatic note to Syria stating its intention to
hold the government of President Bashar al-Assad “responsible under
international law for gross human rights violations and torture in particular”
under the CAT.16 The note requested that Syria enter into negotiations—a
prerequisite for bringing a case before the ICJ under the CAT.17 In
announcing the decision, Dutch foreign minister, Stef Blok, stated that “[t]he
9.

See Order (Request for Indication of Provisional Measures), Gam. v. Myan., 2020 I.C.J., ¶

10.

Belg. v. Sen., 2012 I.C.J., ¶ 69.

11.

Id.

12.

Order (Request for Indication of Provisional Measures), Gam. v. Myan., 2020 I.C.J., ¶ 40.

40.

13.
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
(The Gam. v. Myan.), Summary, 2020 I.C.J. 1 (Jan. 23).
14.
Questions and Answers on Gambia’s Genocide Case Against Myanmar before the
International
Court
of
Justice,
HUM.
RTS.
WATCH
(Dec.
5,
2019),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/12/05/questions-and-answers-gambias-genocide-case-againstmyanmar-international-court#_Why_has_Gambia.
15.
Balkees Jarrah, The Netherlands’ Action Against Syria: A New Path to Justice, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (Sept. 22, 2020), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/09/22/netherlands-action-against-syria-newpath-justice; See also Ido Vock, Assad on Trial, NEWSTATESMAN (Jan. 27, 2021),
https://www.newstatesman.com/world/middle-east/2021/01/assad-trial.
16.
The Netherlands Holds Syria Responsible for Gross Human Rights Violations, GOV. OF THE
NETH. (Sept. 18, 2020), https://www.government.nl/latest/news/2020/09/18/the-netherlands-holds-syriaresponsible-for-gross-human-rights-violations.
17.

Id.
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evidence is overwhelming” of the “horrific crimes” the Assad regime has
committed.18
Nevertheless, even in cases where the evidence appears to be
compelling, claims based solely on erga omnes partes standing are likely to
present the applicant with particular evidentiary challenges.19 The types of
legal controversies that are likely to inspire claims based on erga omnes
partes standing will often feature allegations of violations that are both
widespread and difficult to prove.20 Moreover, the lack of a factual nexus
between the applicant and the legal controversy may pose serious limitations
on the applicant’s access to evidence.21 This article explores the following
issues in the context of proceedings before the ICJ based on erga omnes
partes standing: (i) strategic considerations concerning the initiation of
proceedings; (ii) the types of legal standards that may be applicable in merits
proceedings; and (iii) opportunities and challenges with respect to
marshaling evidence.
I.

STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS BEFORE INSTITUTING PROCEEDINGS

When deciding whether to initiate proceedings based on erga omnes
partes standing and initiate proceedings before the Court, States must
consider the potential ICJ case in the context of the larger strategy for
resolving the dispute at hand.22 An ICJ order and judgment can play an
influential role in addressing gross violations of international human rights
conventions by increasing or maintaining public attention, providing
leverage for diplomatic negotiations, or authoritatively settling disputed
factual issues.23 However, the initiation of contentious proceedings
implicates a host of diplomatic considerations; it may complicate the
applicant’s relationship with the respondent creating the potential for
diplomatic or economic retaliation, and could even frustrate attempts to

18.

Id.

19.
See Priya Pillai, ICJ Order on Provisional Measures: The Gambia v. Myanmar,
OPINIOJURIS (Jan. 24, 2020), https://opiniojuris.org/2020/01/24/icj-order-on-provisional-measures-thegambia-v-myanmar/.
20.

See, e.g., Gino Naldi, Crimes against Humanity and Int’l Courts, 36 IELR 49–53 (2020).

21.
Annie Bird, Third State Responsibility for Human Rights Violations, 21 EUR. J. OF INT’L L.
883, 894–95 (2010).
22.
Christina L. Davis & Julia C. Morse, Protecting Trade by Legalizing Political Disputes:
Why Countries Bring Cases to the International Court of Justice, 62 INT’L STUD. Q. 709, 711 (2018).
23.
Jefferi Hamzah Sendut, An Explainer on The Gambia v. Myanmar at the International Court
of Justice, MEDIUM (May 16, 2020), https://medium.com/@jhs_/an-explainer-on-the-gambia-vmyanmar-at-the-international-court-of-justice-7834529da19c (last visited Jan. 21, 2020).
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resolve the legal controversy by diplomatic means.24 Moreover, pursuit of
an ICJ case also requires significant resources and access to sufficient
evidence.25 Would-be applicants might have to weigh these considerations,
the gravity of the situation, and the availability of other forms of intervention
in deciding whether to proceed.
If a State elects to institute ICJ proceedings based on erga omnes partes
standing, a key strategic question is whether to bring suit alone or as part of
a group of States.26 Since the case would presumably seek to enforce
community values based on their status as such, proceedings featuring
multiple applicants could offer strategic advantages.27 Joint applications by
multiple States, or an application by one State on behalf of a group of States,
could help demonstrate the strong collective interest in attaining
accountability, increasing pressure to resolve the legal controversy.28 States
have long built coalitions before approaching international adjudication29—
from the joint application of France, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom
(with intervention from Poland) in the S.S. Wimbledon case against Germany
in 1922 before the Permanent Court of International Justice,30 to The
Gambia’s application against Myanmar in 2019 on behalf of the fifty-seven
Member States of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.31 Working
together can also allow applicants to share resources, better withstand

24.
Davis & Morse, supra note 22, at 709–10, 720; see Priya Pillai, On the Anvil: The
Netherlands v. Syrian Arab Republic at the International Court of Justice, OPINIOJURIS, (Sept. 29, 2020),
opiniojuris.org/2020/09/29/on-the-anvil-the-netherlands-v-syrian-arab-republic-at-the-internationalcourt-of-justice/.
25.
Davis & Morse, supra note 22, at 710, 714; Q&A: The International Court of Justice & the
JUST.
CTR.
(July
2019),
Genocide
of
the
Rohingya,
GLOB.
https://globaljusticecenter.net/files/20190716_BurmaICJ_QandA_Factsheet_FINAL3.pdf; Pillai, supra
note 24.
26.
See Bruno Gelinas-Faucher, Time for Canada to intervene as World Court tackles the
Rohingya
crisis,
POL’Y
OPTIONS
POLITIQUES
(May
15,
2020),
https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/may-2020/time-for-canada-to-intervene-as-world-courttackles-the-rohingya-crisis/.
27.

See id.

28.

See id.

29.
See generally S.S. Wimbledon (U.K. et al. v. Ger.), Judgment, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 1,
at 15 (Aug. 17); see generally Application Instituting Proceedings & Request for Indication of Provisional
Measures, Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Gam. v.
Myan.), 2019 I.C.J. 1, ¶ 21 (Nov. 11) [hereinafter Application Instituting Proceedings].
30.

U.K. et al. v. Ger., 1923 P.C.I.J. at 15.

31.
Application Instituting Proceedings, Gam. v. Myan., 2019 I.C.J., ¶ 21; Stephanie van den
Berg, Gambia files Rohingya genocide case against Myanmar at World Court: justice minister, REUTERS
(Nov. 11, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-world-court/gambia-filesrohingya-genocide-case-against-myanmar-at-world-court-justice-minister-idUSKBN1XL18S.
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diplomatic backlash, and assume complementary roles in managing a broader
strategy.32
On the other hand, joint proceedings can complicate decision-making
and present coordination challenges.33 Nevertheless, a sole applicant might
not be able to prevent other States from participating in the case, either
through intervention under Articles 62 or 63 of the ICJ Statute34 or a separate
application that the Court could join to the first application, as it did in the
North Sea Continental Shelf and South West Africa cases.35 For example, the
Maldives, the Netherlands, and Canada have expressed interest in
intervening in The Gambia v. Myanmar, to show further “support of the
Rohingya people,”36 “assist with the complex legal issues that are expected
to arise,” and “pay special attention to crimes related to sexual and genderbased violence, including rape.”37
II.

LEGAL STANDARDS ON THE MERITS

Erga omnes partes treaty obligations are generally of heightened
importance; they reflect core values of the State parties, who often elect to
codify them because they reflect core values of the international community
as a whole.38 Indeed, all jus cogens norms give rise to erga omnes
obligations.39 All of the erga omnes obligations that the ICJ first recognized
in Barcelona Traction are jus cogens obligations that are codified in
multilateral treaties today, which presumably give rise to obligations erga

32.

See Gelinas-Faucher, supra note 26.

33.

See id.

34.
Statute of the International Court of Justice, Oct. 24, 1945, ch. III, arts. 62–63, 33 U.N.T.S.
993 [hereinafter I.C.J. Statute].
35.
See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Den./Ger. Ger./Neth.), Order, 1968 I.C.J. 9, 10
(Apr. 26); see also South West Africa Cases (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), Order, 1961 I.C.J. 13, 338
(May 20).
36.
The Republic of Maldives to File Declaration of Intervention in Support of the Rohingya
People, at the International Court of Justice MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF., (Feb. 25, 2020),
https://www.foreign.gov.mv/index.php/en/mediacentre/news/5483-the-republic-of-maldives-to-filedeclaration-of-intervention-in-support-of-the-rohingya-people,-at-the-international-court-of-justice.
37.
Joint statement of Canada and the Kingdom of the Netherlands regarding intention to
intervene in The Gambia v. Myanmar case at the International Court of Justice, GOV’T NETHERLANDS
(Sept. 2, 2020), https://www.government.nl/documents/diplomatic-statements/2020/09/02/jointstatement-of-canada-and-the-kingdom-of-the-netherlands-regarding-intention-to-intervene-in-thegambia-v.-myanmar-case-at-the-international-court-of-justice.
38.
Int’l Law Comm’n, Peremptory Norms of General International Law (Jus Cogens), U.N.
Doc. A/74/10 at 142 (2019).
39.

Id. at 145.
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omnes partes.40 Accordingly, allegations that a State has breached erga
omnes partes obligations will often be the type of serious allegations for
which heightened standards of proof are required.41 By way of example, we
consider here the legal standards for proving genocide under the Genocide
Convention and torture under the CAT, both of which the ICJ is likely to
consider obligations erga omnes partes.42
The ICJ has set a high standard for meeting the scienter requirement of
the Genocide Convention, which defines genocide as any of the acts
enumerated in Article II “committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.”43 The Court held
in Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia v. Serbia) (the Bosnian Genocide case):
[I]t is not enough that the members of the group are targeted
because they belong to that group, that is because the perpetrator
has a discriminatory intent. Something more is required. The acts
listed in Article II must be done with intent to destroy the group as
such in whole or in part.44

At the oral argument on provisional measures in The Gambia v.
Myanmar, counsel for Myanmar went so far as to argue that the existence of
an alternative purpose for the alleged conduct—in that case, purported
counterterrorism objectives—could preclude a finding of the requisite

40.
Belg. v. Spain, 1970 I.C.J. ¶ 33. (“Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary
international law, from the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles
and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection from slavery and racial
discrimination.”). Id.; see, e.g., G.A. Res. 39/46, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane
or Degrading Treatment of Punishment (Dec. 10, 1984) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Convention
Against Torture]; see also G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
art. 1(1) (Dec. 16, 1966); G.A. Res. 666 U.N.T.S. 195, International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, (Dec. 21, 1965); see also G.A. Res. 260 A (III), Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Dec. 9, 1948) [hereinafter Genocide Convention];
U.N. Charter, art. 2, ¶ 7; see also G.A. Res. 212 U.N.T.S. 17, Slavery Convention (Sept. 25, 1926).
41.
See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. v. Serb.), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43, ¶ 187 (Feb. 26) (emphasis added); Convention
Against Torture, supra note 40, arts. 5, 7.
42.

Bosn. v. Serb., 2007 I.C.J., ¶ 187; Convention Against Torture, supra note 40, arts. 5, 7.

43.

Genocide Convention, supra note 40, art. II.

44.
Bosn. v. Serb., 2007 I.C.J. ¶ 187 (emphasis added). But see, e.g., Katherine Goldsmith, The
Issue of Intent in the Genocide Convention and Its Effect on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide: Toward a Knowledge-Based Approach, 5 GENOCIDE STUD. & PREVENTION 238, 245 (2010)
(arguing that, properly construed, the scienter requirement under the Genocide Convention is one of
knowledge).
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intent.45 Proof, whether direct or by inference, of the requisite intent may
require extensive fact-finding.46 When analyzing whether there is sufficient
evidence, often circumstantial, the ICJ appears to show a preference for fact
gathering conducted by United Nations (UN) bodies,47 as discussed further
in Section III. B. below.
Claims under the CAT may also require applicants to meet high legal
standards that require extensive factual support to satisfy.48 CAT defines
torture as an act “by which severe pain or suffering . . . is intentionally
inflicted” for enumerated purposes by or “at the instigation of or with the
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an
official capacity.”49 The ICJ has not yet interpreted this standard.50 Belgium
v. Senegal, the sole CAT case before the ICJ, did not seek to hold Senegal
responsible for acts of torture, but rather for its failure to prosecute or
extradite former Chadian president Hissène Habré for acts of torture that he
committed.51 But based on the plain terms of the CAT, the jurisprudence of
the Committee Against Torture—the Geneva-based treaty body charged with
monitoring compliance with CAT—and the jurisprudence of international
criminal tribunals, the Court is likely to require specific intent.52
State attribution is another inquiry that may present challenging legal
standards in the context of proving violations of obligations erga omnes
partes.53 In order to establish conduct attributable to a State under
international law, the alleged act or omission must either be committed by an
organ, person, or entity acting under the authority, instruction, direction, or
45.
Order (Request for Indication of Provisional Measures), Gam. v. Myan., 2020 I.C.J. ¶ 47;
Kerstin Bree Carlson & Line Engbo Gissel, Why the Gambia’s plea for the Rohingya matters for
international justice, CONVERSATION (Jan. 14, 2009), https://theconversation.com/why-the-gambiasplea-for-the-rohingya-matters-for-international-justice-129365. (“Should the Court agree that there is
ample support for an alternative explanation, then it cannot but conclude that the application has no
reasonable chance of success on the merits. Not a 50 per cent chance. Not a 25 per cent chance. No
chance.”). Id.
46.
See Hum. Rts. Council, Report of the detailed findings of the Independent International
Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, Office of the High Comm'r on Human Rights, p. 14, ¶ 45 U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/42/CRP.5 (Sept. 16, 2018).
47.
ANNA RIDDELL & BRENDAN PLANT, EVIDENCE BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE 239 (2016 ed.).
48.

Convention Against Torture, supra note 40, art. 7.

49.

Id. art. 1.

50.

See generally Belg. v. Sen., 2012 I.C.J., ¶ 73.

51.

See generally id. ¶ 73; see also Convention Against Torture, supra note 40, arts. 6–7.

52.
See Oona Hathaway et al., Tortured Reasoning: The Intent to Torture under International
and Domestic Law, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 791, 827 (2012).
53.
James Crawford (Special Rapporteur), First Rep. on State Responsibility, ¶ 155, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/490 (1998).
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control of the State—whether formal or de facto—or acknowledged and
adopted by the State as its own conduct.54 Allegations concerning erga
omnes partes obligations, such as allegations of genocide and torture, will
often be susceptible to attribution defenses.55 For example, in the Bosnian
Genocide case, even though the Court did find sufficient evidence of specific
intent to commit genocide, it was unable to attribute the conduct of the Army
of Republika Srpska to Serbia.56 The Court, nevertheless, found that Serbia
had violated its obligation to prevent the Srebrenica massacre under Article
1.57 As with the Genocide Convention, erga omnes partes claims under CAT
may also entail attribution issues.58 Building a link between allegations of
torture and public officials will also raise complex issues not just of law, but
also of fact,59 to which we now turn.
III. MARSHALLING EVIDENCE
The types of legal controversies that are likely to inspire efforts to secure
ICJ intervention by unaffected States will often feature widespread violations
of erga omnes partes obligations, requiring extensive fact development.60
For example, reports indicate that more than 14,000 detainees have been
killed “due to torture” at the hands of the Assad regime between March 2011
and September 2020.61 Similarly, reports indicate that Myanmar’s security
forces killed at least 6700 Rohingya between late August and late September
2017 and have uprooted approximately one million Rohingya Muslims who
are now left as stateless refugees sheltering in neighboring Bangladesh.62

54.
(2001).

Int'l Law Comm'n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, ¶ 76, U.N. Doc. A/56/10

55.

Id.

56.

Bosn. v. Serb., 2007 I.C.J., ¶ 394.

57.

Id. ¶ 438.

58.

Id. ¶ 380–81.

59.

Id. ¶ 65.

60.

Bird, supra note 21, at 889.

61.
Death Toll Due to Torture, SYRIAN NETWORK FOR HUM. RTS. (Dec. 1, 2020)
https://sn4hr.org/blog/2020/12/01/death-toll-due-to-torture/ (cited in Anne Barnard, Inside Syria’s Secret
Torture
Prisons,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
11,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/11/world/middleeast/syria-torture-prisons.html).
62.
Hannah Beech et al., ‘Kill All You See’: In a First, Myanmar Soldiers Tell of Rohingya
Slaughter,
N.Y.
TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/08/world/asia/myanmar-rohingyagenocide.html (last updated Dec. 4, 2020).
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Accordingly, The Gambia’s 2020 memorial spans over 500 pages with more
than 5000 annexed pages of supporting materials.63
Applicants basing themselves solely on erga omnes partes standing will
often face particular challenges in securing access to the evidence necessary
to build their case64 because the alleged violations will not directly affect the
applicant or its nationals and are likely to have occurred within the
respondent State’s territory.65 Of course, this difficulty is not necessarily
unique to cases involving erga omnes partes standing.66 As Judge Owada
observed in Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of
America) (Oil Platforms), there is often an “inherent asymmetry that comes
into the process of discharging the burden of proof.”67 That asymmetry
featured in Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia) (the Croatian Genocide case),
where the Court ultimately dismissed Croatia’s claim that Serbia was “best
placed . . . to provide explanations of acts which are claimed to have taken
place in a territory over which Serbia exercised exclusive control.”68
However, the Court may afford an applicant alleging violations of erga
omnes partes obligations within the exclusive territorial control of the
respondent “a more liberal recourse to inferences of fact and circumstantial
evidence” as it did in Corfu Channel (United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland v. Albania) (Corfu Channel).69
Attempts by a respondent to destroy evidence or otherwise impede the
applicant’s access to information can exacerbate the inherent asymmetry.70
Indeed, the risks of evidentiary obstruction may be higher in cases alleging
breaches of erga omnes partes obligations due to the seriousness of such
allegations and the intense international scrutiny they will often inspire.71 For
example, the preservation of evidence has been the basis of two provisional
measure requests by The Gambia in Gambia v. Myanmar.72 Below we
discuss the implications that the asymmetry in access to information likely to
63.
Gambia files Memorial with ICJ Over Myanmar, POINT (Oct. 26, 2020),
https://thepoint.gm/africa/gambia/headlines/gambia-files-memorial-with-icj-over-myanmar.
64.

Pillai, supra note 19.

65.

Bird, supra note 21, at 887.

66.

Id.

67.
Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. REP. 161, 306 (Nov. 6), ¶¶ 46–47 (J. Owada,
concurring).
68.
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Croat. v. Serb.), Judgment, 2015 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 170 (Feb. 3).
69.

Corfu Channel (U.K. & N. Ir. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, at 18 (Apr. 9).

70.

Order (Request for Indication of Provisional Measures), Gam. v. Myan., 2020 I.C.J., ¶ 5.

71.

Id.

72.

Id.
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attend cases based on erga omnes partes standing may have for the different
types of evidence that typically feature in ICJ proceedings.
A.

Documentary Evidence

Documentary evidence has been described as “the most common and
certainly the most important type of evidence in litigation before the ICJ.”73
Applicants in cases based on erga omnes partes standing will often face
challenges in marshaling documentary evidence for the reasons set forth
above.74 As the Court has observed in Croatia v. Serbia and Pulp Mills on
the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), while:
[T]he burden of proof rests in principle on the party which alleges
a fact, this does not relieve the other party of its duty to co-operate
in the provision of such evidence as may be in its possession that
could assist the Court in resolving the dispute submitted to it.75

The authenticity, provenance, and reliability of documentary evidence
will often be a source of contention.76 The Court’s general approach is to
liberally admit evidence and then address concerns as to credibility in
determining what weight to give that evidence.77 The use of audiovisual
evidence in the Bosnian Genocide case illustrates the Court’s approach.78 In
that case, Bosnia sought to admit a video purporting to show the execution
of six Bosnian Muslims.79 Although the Court admitted the video recording,
it did not expressly serve as the basis of its conclusions.80

73.

RIDDELL & PLANT, supra note 47, at 231.

74.

See generally id.

75.
Croat. v. Serb., 2015 I.C.J., ¶ 173; Pulp Mills on River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment,
2010 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 163 (Apr. 20).
76.

Bosn. v. Serb., 2007 I.C.J., ¶¶ 221–22.

77.

Id. ¶¶ 221–23.

78.

Id. ¶ 289.

79.
Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Application for Limited Reopening of Bosnia and Kosovo Components of Prosecution Case, ¶ 38 (Int’l Trib. for the Prosecution of
Pers. Responsible for Serious Violations of Int’l Humanitarian L. Committed in Terr. of Former
Yugoslavia since 1991 Dec. 13, 2005) (finding the video of insufficient probative value to warrant
admission as the basis of a re-opened case).
80.

Bosn. v. Serb., 2007 I.C.J., ¶¶ 289, 389.
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B.

Third-Party Reporting

Beyond their role as custodians of documentary evidence, third parties,
including UN bodies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), will
often play a key role in reporting on events relevant to disputes brought on
the basis of erga omnes partes standing.81

1.

UN Fact-Finding

The ICJ has relied extensively on reporting from UN agencies,
including country missions and reports of special rapporteurs.82
Commentators have observed that the Court has “attached considerable
probative value to reports compiled and communicated by UN agencies” in
complex, fact-intensive legal controversies.83 For instance, in Bosnian
Genocide, the Court relied on reports by the UN Secretary-General and a
Commission of Experts that the Secretary-General had appointed.84 In
assessing the evidentiary value, the Court expressly considered the following
factors:
(1) [T]he source of the item of evidence (for instance partisan, or
neutral), (2) the process by which it has been generated (for
instance an anonymous press report or the product of a careful
court or court-like process), and (3) the quality or character of the
item (such as statements against interest, and agreed or
uncontested facts).85

The Court reaffirmed these factors in the Croatian Genocide case and
concluded that a report by a UN Special Rapporteur appointed by the
Commission on Human Rights deserved “evidential weight . . . by reason
both of the independent status of its author, and of the fact that it was prepared
81.
See Mads Andenas & Thomas Weatherall, International Court of Justice: Questions
Relating to the Obligation to Extradite or Prosecute (Belgium v. Senegal) judgment of 20 July 2012, 62
INT’L COMPAR. L.Q. 753, 754, 762, 765 (2013); see also Radio Free Asia, Lawyer: Genocide Case
Against Myanmar Based on ‘Compelling’ Evidence, VOICE AM. (Nov. 22, 2019),
https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/lawyer-genocide-case-against-myanmar-based-compellingevidence.
82.
Q&A: The Gambia v. Myanmar (Rohingya Genocide at the International Court of Justice),
GLOB. JUST. CTR. 3 (May 2020), https://globaljusticecenter.net/files/20200115_BurmaICJ_QandA.pdf.
83.
Bosn. v. Serb., 2007 I.C.J., ¶¶ 228–30; Armed Activities on Territory of Congo (Dem. Rep.
Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶¶ 60, 182 (Dec. 19); RIDDELL & PLANT, supra note 47,
at 237–39.
84.

Bosn. v. Serb., 2007 I.C.J., ¶ 211.

85.

Id. ¶ 227.
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at the request of organs of the United Nations, for purposes of the exercise of
their functions.”86 Similarly, in Armed Activities on the Territory of the
Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda) (Armed Activities),
the Court explained that it would “take into consideration evidence contained
in certain United Nations documents to the extent that they are of probative
value and are corroborated, if necessary, by other credible sources.”87
The Court’s willingness to afford evidentiary weight to UN reports
suggests that applicants in cases based on erga omnes partes standing will
find themselves on firm footing when relying on fact-finding that UN bodies
have conducted.88 Indeed, in its provisional measures order in The Gambia
v. Myanmar, the Court relied on the evidence collected to date by the UN
Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar (succeeded by
the UN Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM)).89 The
Human Rights Council established IIMM “to collect, consolidate, preserve
and analyze evidence of the most serious international crimes and violations
of international law committed in Myanmar,” in order to facilitate future
judicial proceedings.90 If the Netherlands ultimately brings a case against
Syria, it will likely similarly benefit from the work of the International,
Impartial and Independent Mechanism, which, like the IIMM, operates under
a UN mandate to collect, preserve, and analyze evidence.91 Of course, the
Court’s reliance on UN reporting has its limits.92 While the IIMM found
“reasonable grounds to conclude that there is a strong inference of genocidal
intent on the part of the State” based on hostile policies towards the
Rohingya, denial of their citizenship and ethnic identity, hate speech,

86.

Croat. v. Serb., 2015 I.C.J., ¶ 459.

87.

Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda, 2005 I.C.J., ¶ 205.

88.
See Order (Request for Indication of Provisional Measures), Gam. v. Myan., 2020 I.C.J., ¶¶
10, 22, 37–38.
89.
See id.; Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, U.N. HUM. RTS.
COUNCIL, https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/hrc/myanmarffm/pages/index.aspx (last visited Jan. 22,
2021); What is the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar?, U.N., https://iimm.un.org/whatis-the-independent-investigative-mechanism-for-myanmar/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2021).
90.

Human Rights Council Res. 39/2, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/39/2, at 1–2, 5 (Sept. 27, 2018).

91.
G. A. Res. 71/248, International, Impartial, and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the
Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International
Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011, ¶ 4 (Jan. 11, 2017).
92.
See generally Order (Request for Indication of Provisional Measures), Gam. v. Myan., 2020
I.C.J., ¶ 66.
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condoned living conditions, and impunity to date, the Court will ultimately
draw its own legal conclusion of the intent requirement on the merits.93

2.

NGO Fact-Finding

In addition to UN fact-finding, many NGOs collect data from victims
and other sources that may prove invaluable for States alleging breaches of
erga omnes partes obligations.94 However, the Court has afforded less
evidentiary weight to NGO reports than UN reports.95 In Armed Activities,
the Court declined to credit a factual finding from a report by International
Crisis Group, declaring that it “does not constitute reliable evidence.”96 Still,
each NGO report or document will be assessed by the Court individually. 97
In the Croatian Genocide case, for instance, the Court duly considered a
report from Human Rights Watch, albeit not regarding it “as conclusive proof
of the facts alleged.”98
More recently, innovations in data security and metadata have improved
the reliability of digital information collected by NGOs.99 However, these
new tools introduce a range of evidentiary issues, including issues
concerning the reliability of third-party custodians and their methods,
electronic evidence, and confidential testimony.100
C.

Witness Evidence

Where there is access to witnesses, witness testimony may be of
particular value to an applicant seeking to overcome the asymmetrical access
to documentary evidence, which is likely to feature in the context of

93.
Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Indep. Int’l Fact-Finding Mission on Myan., ¶¶ 1, 14–
15, 90, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/42/50 (2019); Order (Request for Indication of Provisional Measures), Gam.
v. Myan., 2020 I.C.J., ¶ 66.
94.
See Compilation of International Norms and Standards Relating to Disability, UNITED
NATIONS, https://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/discom104.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2021).
95.

See RIDDELL & PLANT, supra note 47, at 248–49.

96.

Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda, 2005 I.C.J., ¶¶ 73, 129.

97.

See Croat. v. Serb., 2015 I.C.J., ¶ 458.

98.

Id.

99.
Philip Alston & Colin Gillespie, Global Human Rights Monitoring, New Technologies, and
the Politics of Information, 23 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1089, 1092, 1112–14, 1122 (2012).
100. Nikita Mehandru & Alexa Koenig, Open Source Evidence and the International Criminal
Court, HARV. HUM. RTS. J. (Apr. 15, 2019), https://harvardhrj.com/2019/04/open-source-evidence-andthe-international-criminal-court/.

351926-ILSA_International_27-2_Text.indd 24

3/26/21 12:35 PM

Ukabiala, Pickard, & Yamamoto

2021]

247

proceedings based on erga omnes partes standing.101 In Qatar v. United Arab
Emirates, Qatar submitted over 100 witness statements from Qatari nationals
affected by the United Arab Emirate’s measures.102 An applicant basing
itself on erga omnes partes standing may face greater challenges in securing
witness testimony because the legal controversy will not directly concern the
applicant’s nationals, and nationals of the respondent may fear that giving
witness evidence will expose them to reprisals.103 The Court may order
protective measures to facilitate the provision of witness testimony, such as
the use of pseudonyms and redactions to public documents to obscure
potentially identifying information.104
Although “neither its Statute nor its Rules lay down any specific
requirements concerning the admissibility of statements which are presented
by the parties in the course of contentious proceedings” and the “Court leaves
the parties free to determine the form in which they present evidence,” it will
weigh all evidence, including witness testimony, according to its
credibility.105 The Court treats written witness statements “with caution,”
taking into account their form and the circumstances in which they were
made.106 In looking at the circumstances in which the statements are made,
the Court considers factors such as “whether they were made by State
officials or by private persons not interested in the outcome of the
proceedings and whether a particular affidavit attests to the existence of facts
or represents only an opinion as regards certain events.”107 In the Croatian
Genocide case, the Court gave no weight to unsigned witness statements and
noted “difficulties” with certain statements that “fail to mention the
circumstances in which they were given or were only made several years
after the events to which they refer.”108 The Court has given “special value”

101. Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Qatar v. U.A.E), Memorial of Qatar, vols. VII, XI, XII (Apr. 25, 2019).
102.

See id.

103.

Croat. v. Serb., 2015 I.C.J., ¶ 43.

104.

Id. ¶ 33; see also Kubo Mačák, Article 43, THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
1215, 1275 (2019).

OF JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY

105.

Croat. v. Serb., 2015 I.C.J., ¶ 196.

106.

Id. ¶ 196.

107. Territorial and Maritime Dispute Between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea
(Nicar. v. Hond.), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 659, ¶ 244 (Oct. 8).
108.

Croat. v. Serb., 2015 I.C.J., ¶ 199.
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to witness “evidence which is contemporaneous with the period
concerned.”109 It has also discounted hearsay evidence.110
D.

Proceedings of Other Adjudicatory Bodies

Evidence presented to and the findings of national courts and other
international courts can serve as a resource to applicants in ICJ proceedings
seeking to overcome the evidentiary challenges associated with erga omnes
partes standing.111
The evolution of erga omnes partes standing before the ICJ coincides
with the rise of the exercise of universal jurisdiction by national courts as a
means of addressing impunity for violation of core values of the international
community.112 For example, the Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK
initiated a case in Argentina against Myanmar’s top military and civilian
leaders, alleging the commission of atrocity crimes against the Rohingya in
Myanmar.113 More recently, prosecutors in Koblenz, Germany, brought
criminal charges of torture against two former senior officials of the Assad
regime currently living in Germany.114 Seventeen alleged victims of the
defendants, formerly detained at the al-Khatib prison in Damascus, gave
testimony in that trial in fall 2020.115
The Court’s jurisprudence demonstrates a willingness to consider
evidence presented before national courts and the findings of other
international courts.116 For example, in the Croatian Genocide case, the
Court considered the statements of witnesses given in the national courts of
Bosnia and Serbia “without, however, being regarded as conclusive proof of
the facts alleged.”117 The Court also appeared to give substantial weight to
109.

Nicar. v. Hond., 2007 I.C.J., ¶ 244.

110. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U. S.),
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 68 (June 27).
111.

RIDDELL & PLANT, supra note 47, at 236.

112. See Argentinean Courts Urged to Prosecute Senior Myanmar Military and Government
Officials for The Rohingya Genocide, BURMESE ROHINGYA ORGANISATION U.K. (Nov. 13, 2019),
https://www.brouk.org.uk/argentinean-courts-urged-to-prosecute-senior-myanmar-military-andgovernment-officials-for-the-rohingya-genocide.
113.

Id.

See First Criminal Trial Worldwide on Torture in Syria Before a German Court, EUR. CTR.
CONST. AND HUM. RTS., https://www.ecchr.eu/en/case/first-criminal-trial-worldwide-on-torture-insyria-before-a-german-court/#:~:text=The%20first%20trial%20worldwide%20on,apparatus%
2C%20for%20crimes%20against%20humanity (last visited Feb. 17, 2021).
114.

FOR

115.

Id.

116.

See generally Croat. v. Serb., 2015 I.C.J., ¶ 170.

117.

Id. ¶ 459.
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evidence presented to, and the findings of, the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.118
Proceedings before national courts have also emerged as a means to
secure evidence to support erga omnes partes claims before the ICJ.119 In
June 2020, The Gambia initiated proceedings in the United States, invoking
United States statute 28 U.S.C. § 1782, which provides an avenue for
obtaining evidence to aid ongoing judicial proceedings.120 In particular, The
Gambia sought to compel Facebook to provide data on “suspended or
terminated” accounts of Myanmar officials, likely in an effort to demonstrate
genocidal intent.121 The matter remains pending before the District of
Columbia District Court.122
E.

Judicial Intervention

The ICJ Statute affords the Court extensive powers for obtaining
evidence that could be of particular value in a case based on erga omnes
partes standing in which the applicant has limited access to evidence of
events that occurred within the respondent’s territory.123 For instance, Article
49 permits the Court to “call upon the agents to produce any document or to
supply any explanations;”124 Article 50 authorizes the Court to “entrust any
individual, body, bureau, commission, or other organization that it may
select, with the task of carrying out an enquiry [sic] or giving an expert
opinion;”125 Article 34(2) permits the Court to “request of public
international organizations information relevant to cases before it;”126 and
Article 44(2) provides for the possibility of full-Court site visits to “procure
evidence on the spot.”127 In Oil Platforms, Judge Owada opined that in cases
featuring an asymmetry in access to evidence, the Court should engage in a:
118.

Id. ¶ 76.

119. See, e.g., Application for Order to Take Discovery Pursuant to 28 U.S.C 1782, In re:
Application Pursuant to 28 U.S.C 1782 et al. v. Facebook, Inc., No. 1:20MC00036 (D.D.C. filed 2020).
120.

Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1782.

121. Memorandum of Law in Support of the Republic of Gambia’s Application for Order to Take
Discovery Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1782 at 16, In re: Application Pursuant to 28 U.S.C 1782 et al. v.
Facebook, Inc., No. 1:20MC00036 (D.D.C. filed 2020).
122. See Application Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1782 v. Facebook, Inc., No. 1:20-mc-00036 (D.D.C.
filed June 8, 2020).
123.

I.C.J Statute, supra note 34, art. 44.

124.

Id. art. 49.

125.

Id. art. 50.

126.

Id. art. 34, ¶ 2.

127.

Id. art. 44.
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[M]ore in-depth examination of this difficult problem of
ascertaining the facts of the case, if necessary proprio motu,
through various powers and procedural means available to the
Court under its Statute and the Rules of Court, including those
relating to the questions of the burden of proof and the standard of
proof, in the concrete context of the present case.128

However, the ICJ has rarely invoked these statutory powers.129 It has
sought an expert opinion propio motu only once, in the Corfu Channel
case.130 The only site visit under Article 66 took place in GabčíkovoNagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), when Slovakia invited the Court to
“visit the locality to which the case relates and there to exercise its functions
with regards to the obtaining of evidence.”131
One commentator opines that the ICJ has taken a generally “reactive
role” with respect to evidence gathering, despite possessing broad
evidentiary powers under the Statute of the Court.132 However, if ICJ
practice evolves to feature increased cases based on standing erga omnes
partes, increased pressure on the Court to be more proactive in exercising its
evidentiary powers may also be on the horizon.
IV. CONCLUSION
The evolution of erga omnes partes standing before the ICJ brings
welcome opportunities for the greater enforcement of community values and
could serve as a valuable tool in achieving accountability and redressing
human rights violations. However, standing is only the first step. The pursuit
of merits judgments in specific cases will require careful consideration of
case strategy, the legal standards that will apply during merits proceedings,
and the marshaling of evidence to meet the applicant’s burden of proof.

128.

Iran v. U.S., 2003 I.C.J., ¶ 52.

129.

See, e.g., U.K. & N. Ir. v. Alb.,1949 I.C.J., at 9.

130.

Id.

131.

Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 7, ¶ 10 (Sept. 25).

132. JAMES GERARD DEVANEY, FACT-FINDING BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
73–126 (2016).
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1.
Ariel Levy, Ophelia Dahl’s National Health Service, THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 11, 2017.
[Farmer and his partners] were particularly taken with the Peruvian philosopher and priest Gustavo
Gutiérrez’s conception of a ‘preferential option for the poor.’ Because God favors the poor and the
powerless, Gutiérrez argued, Christianity should focus on the injustices visited upon the destitute. To
[Farmer and his partners], it seemed clear that this doctrine applied to health care, too.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The coronavirus was called a “rich man’s disease” when it first appeared
in some countries, brought by travelers returning from business trips in
China, ski vacations in the Rockies, and studies in Europe.2 It did not remain
confined to the better neighborhoods for long. As Part I of this Article shows,
the poor, everywhere, are more likely to get sick and more likely to die when
they do.3 In many countries, they are also more likely to starve.4 As
researchers noted in March, “[a]s the coronavirus spreads across the globe, it
appears to be setting off a devastating feedback loop with another of the
gravest forces of our time: economic inequality.”5
Part II explains why this is a matter of human rights.6 The ongoing
deprivation of basic rights to healthcare and an adequate standard of living

2.
Shashank Bengali et al., How Coronavirus—a “Rich Man’s Disease” Infected the Poor,
L.A. TIMES (May 8, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2020-05-08/how-thecoronavirus-began-as-a-disease-of-the-rich.
3.
Max Fisher & Emma Bubola, As Coronavirus Deepens Inequality, Inequality Worsens Its
Spread, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/15/world/europe/coronavirusinequality.html; see David Segal, What Happened to the Great American Logistics Machine?, N.Y.
TIMES, May 24, 2020, at B1 (noting that “the coronavirus is offering a real-time demonstration of how to
hopscotch the globe, with ease and speed.”).
4.
Abdi Latif Dahir, ‘Instead of Coronavirus, the Hunger Will Kill Us.’ A Global Food Crisis
Looms., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/22/world/africa/coronavirushunger-crisis.html.
5.
Fisher & Bubola, supra note 3.
6.
For purposes of this Article, human rights include: G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948); G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICESCR]; G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A,
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR]; G.A. Res. 2106
(XX), Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Dec. 21, 1965) [hereinafter
CERD]; G.A. Res. 34/180, Convention on the Elimination of All Form of Discrimination Against Women
(Dec. 18, 1979) [hereinafter CEDAW]; G.A. Res. 44/25, Convention on the Rights of the Child (Nov. 20,
1989) [hereinafter CRC].
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are major factors.7 As this Part demonstrates, however, the extreme
vulnerability of the poor is grounded in earlier violations of human rights,
including state-sanctioned segregation in the American south in the 1950s
and what one author has called “the darker side of American hegemony,”
referring to the United States’ role in the violent overthrow of leftist regimes
during the Cold War.8
Part III argues that the current crises demand a broader, deeper, and
more authentic commitment to human rights. This Part draws on
vulnerability theory,9 abolition theory,10 and a new theory of ‘intercountry’
human rights11 to support this expanded commitment and proposes two
concrete legal reforms to realize it. First, it proposes that the United States
fulfil its early promise to promote human rights. Second, it proposes that the
United States assure certain human rights for specific groups which
otherwise would have no claim against it.12
In short, we are living in a world of “obscene” economic inequality,13
in which some lives matter, and others do not. The United States has played
a major role in creating this world, in part by violating the human rights of
7.
Bengali et al., supra note 2; U.N. Secretary-General, Policy Brief: COVID-19 and People
on the Move (June 2020), https://unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/2020-06/SG-Policy-Brief-on-People-onthe-Move.pdf [hereinafter Policy Brief].
8.
Vincent Bevins, The ‘Liberal World Order’ Was Built With Blood, N.Y. TIMES (May 29,
2020) https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/29/opinion/sunday/united-states-cold-war.html.
9.
See, e.g., VULNERABILITY: REFLECTIONS ON A NEW ETHICAL FOUNDATION FOR LAW AND
POLITICS (Martha Albertson Fineman & Anna Grear eds. 2013). Professor Fineman established the
Vulnerability and the Law Initiative at Emory University in 2008. It is based on the idea that vulnerability
is “universal and constant, inherent in the human condition” and that focusing on vulnerability “suggests
a critique of dominant modes of thinking about inequality.” Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable
Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, 20 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 1, 1, 11 (2008)
[hereinafter Equality in the Human Condition].
10.
Patrisse Cullors, Abolition, and Reparations: Histories of Resistance, Transformative
Justice, and Accountability, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1684, 1686 (2019).
11.
See Barbara Stark, Toward a Theory of Intercountry Human Rights: Global Capitalism and
the Rise and Fall of Intercountry Adoption, 95 IND. L. J. 1365, 1391–95 (2020) (setting out a theory of
intercountry human rights in the context of intercountry adoption).
12.
This is hardly a radical idea. A strong form is seen in the early requirement that Member
States ratify the European Convention on Human Rights before admission to the Council of Europe, and
the more recent Treaty of Lisbon (2009), under which the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU
became binding on EU Member States. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 2889 U.N.T.S. 222. A weaker, or more limited, version can be seen in the Banjul
Charter. African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 27 June 1981, OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (which requires that children can be adopted from Member States
only by individuals in other Member States, or in states that are a party to the Convention on the Rights
of the Child).
13.
The characterization is in Philip Alston, Extreme Inequality as the Antithesis of Human
Rights, OPENGLOBALRIGHTS (Aug. 27, 2015), https://www.openglobalrights.org/extreme-inequality-asthe-antithesis-of-human-rights/ [hereinafter Extreme Inequality].
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Black Americans, immigrants, and asylum-seekers. This Article argues that
the United States should take responsibility for these violations and suggests
how it may begin.
II.
A.

COVID-19 TARGETS THE POOR

Inequality Going into the Pandemic

The world’s richest 1%, those with over $1 million in assets minus
debts, own 44% of the world’s wealth; 56.6 % of the world’s population have
less than $10,000 in assets and own less than 2% of the world’s wealth.14
According to Oxfam, the concentration of wealth is getting more extreme.15
In 2009, 380 billionaires owned what the bottom 50% of the global
population owned; in 2018, only twenty-six billionaires owned what the
bottom 50% owned.16 As Thomas Piketty has shown, birth predicts wealth
as certainly as it did during the Gilded Age.17
Income is also deeply skewed.18 The top 1% earned more than 20% of
global income in 2018, up from 16% in 1980.19 The post-World War II trend
toward greater equality of incomes was reversed during the roughly thirty
years from 1980–2013.20 During this period the richest 1% in the United
States saw their average real income increase from $469,403 adjusted for
inflation, to $1,260,508 and their share of national income double, from 10%
to 21%.21 The top .1% saw their average real income increase from
$1,597,080, adjusted for inflation, to $6,087,113 and their share of national
income almost tripled, from 3.4 to 10.3%.22 In the United States, those in the
bottom quintile, in contrast, saw an increase of only 9% during roughly the
same period, during which they increased their average work hours by 72%.23

14.
Global Inequality Facts, INEQUALITY, https://inequality.org/facts/global-inequality/ (last
visited Jan. 11, 2021) (citing Credit Suisse Research Institute, GLOBAL WEALTH REPORT 2020, Oct.
2020).
15.
Id.
16.
Id.; see World’s Billionaires List: The Richest in 2020,
FORBES,
https://www.forbes.com/billionaires/#a97200b251c7 (last updated Mar. 18, 2020) (noting that 51% of the
billionaires are poorer than they were in 2019, because of the virus).
17.
THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 408–09, 421 (Arthur
Goldhammer trans., 2014).
18.
Global Inequality Facts, supra note 14.
19.
Id.
20.
Joseph Stiglitz, Inequality and Economic Growth, 86 POL. Q. 134, 134 (2015); see also
DAVID M. KOTZ, THE RISE AND FALL OF NEOLIBERAL CAPITALISM 95–99 (2015) (describing the same
trend).
21.
Stiglitz, supra note 20, at 135.
22.
Id. at 134–35.
23.
Id.
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In the first three years after the Great Recession, 91% of the gains in income
went to the top 1%.24
This inequality is a product of the neoliberalism that emerged in the late
1970s and became hegemonic after the end of the Cold War in 1989. As
Robert Howse put it, “the old struggle between [the] right and [t]he left over
the governance of the economy and the redistribution of wealth within the
advanced liberal democracies had yielded to a new pro-market consensus.”25
Neoliberalism was grounded in the conviction that free markets, unrestrained
by irrational humans and free of onerous regulations, were our best collective
hope.26 It promised that global capitalism would improve human well-being
where badly managed, often corrupt, social welfare schemes had failed.27
But the extreme wealth at the top never “trickled down.”28 Instead, the
American housing bubble burst in 2007 and markets panicked, triggering the
Great Recession.29 The United States economy constituted such a large
proportion of the global economy that when it sank, it took the rest of the
world with it.30 In addition, the United States had already exported its
neoliberal philosophy.31 The Great Recession spread like wildfire because
neoliberal globalization had already eliminated the protections that might
have slowed it.32 Those in low-income states were especially vulnerable.33
They were immediately hit by the collapse in global demand.34
Remittances—which have always dwarfed foreign aid—from the United
States and Europe fell.35
This matters here for three reasons. First, neoliberalism required that
states slash social safety nets, privatize once-public functions (like
maintaining clinics and prisons), and reduce or eliminate environmental,

24.
Id. at 136.
25.
Robert Howse, The End of the Globalization Debate, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1528, 1529 (2008)
(book review).
26.
DANIEL STEDMAN JONES, MASTERS OF THE UNIVERSE: HAYAK, FRIEDMAN AND THE BIRTH
OF NEOLIBERAL POLITICS 2 (2012); DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 37 (2005).
27.
See generally Stiglitz, supra note 20, at 134.
28.
KOTZ, supra note 20, at 98. Harvey argues that the real goal of neoliberalism was to restore
wealth to the top 1% of the population. HARVEY, supra note 26, at 15–18 (drawing on the analyses of
data by Gérard Duménil and Dominique Lévy, charting the “extraordinary concentrations of wealth and
power emerging all over the place.”).
29.
See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE MARKETS, AND THE SINKING OF THE
WORLD ECONOMY 21–24 (2010) [hereinafter FREEFALL].
30.
Id.
31.
Id.
32.
Id.
33.
See generally id.
34.
FREEFALL, supra note 29.
35.
Id. at 24. See note 68, infra.
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financial, and health and safety regulations.36 These policies were referred
to as “structural adjustment” when imposed by the International Monetary
Fund in the global south,37 or “austerity” when imposed by richer lenders on
poorer borrowers in the global north. 38 This meant that the world’s poor had
already lost the protections—including government health and welfare
services, decent-paying government jobs (with benefits), and health and
safety regulations—that might have helped them avoid or survive COVID19 by the time it hit. Second, thirty years of neoliberalism had eliminated
state agencies, the government workers who ran them, and the infrastructure
that supported them. Third, but equally important, the idea that it was the
state’s responsibility to assure the well-being of its people, or that it even had
that capacity, was a dim memory for many, and unimaginable for some.39
B.

How the Poor Are Affected

Low socioeconomic status has joined old age and pre-existing health
conditions as major risk factors resulting in death for those who become
infected.40 This section focuses on two groups, Black Americans and those
who the United Nations (UN) refers to as “people on the move”—migrants,
refugees, and internally displaced persons (IDP).41 Members of both groups
are disproportionately likely to get sick, and more likely to die if they do.
According to the Chinese Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
because health disparities have grown along with the gap between the rich
and the poor, those at the bottom are also more likely to have chronic
conditions.42 COVID-19 is roughly twice as deadly for them.43

1.

Black Americans

In 2019, the median family wealth for a white family was $188,200,
eight times that of a Black family, $24,100.44 This meant that a typical white
36.
JONES, supra note 26, at 16, 242–49.
37.
HARVEY, supra note 26, at 37–38 (describing the Washington Consensus).
38.
Id. at 100.
39.
See WENDY BROWN, UNDOING THE DEMOS: NEOLIBERALISM’S STEALTH REVOLUTION
221(2015) (noting that neoliberalism rejects the idea that humanity can “craft and steer its existence or
even to secure its future.”).
40.
Fisher & Bubola, supra note 3.
41.
Policy Brief, supra note 7 (aggregating migrant, refugees, and internally displaced persons
(IDP)).
42.
Fisher & Bubola, supra note 3.
43.
Id.
44.
Rachel Siegel, Wealth Gaps Between Black and White Families Persisted Even at the Height
of the Economic Expansion, WASH. POST (Sept. 28, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business
/2020/09/28/wealth-gap-fed/.

351926-ILSA_International_27-2_Text.indd 34

3/26/21 12:35 PM

2021]

Stark

257

family had $50,600 to draw on in an emergency, while a typical Black family
had $14,400.45 As noted by a Federal Reserve staff researcher, “[t]hese gaps
in savings are particularly relevant in light of the COVID-19 pandemic and
associated job losses . . . [suggesting] large disparities in families’ ability to
weather the pandemic.”46 Black Americans are also more likely to be
unemployed and less likely to receive unemployment insurance.47
Black Americans account for more than half of those who have tested
positive and 72% of virus-related deaths in Chicago, even though they
comprise slightly less than a third of the population.48 Similar disparities
have been reported in Michigan, Louisiana, North Carolina, and South
Carolina.49 As of April 2020, officials in many states hit hard by the virus—
including California and New York—had not made statewide information
about race available50 and “fewer than a dozen states” had published such
information.51 In May, the nonpartisan APM Research Lab released an
analysis of data from forty states and the District of Columbia, which found
that Black Americans were more than twice as likely as whites, Latinos, or
Asian Americans to die from the virus.52 Under pressure from Congress, the
Trump administration finally required the states to include race and ethnicity
data in June.53 But as of December 16, 2020, the Center for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) reported that such data was only available for 50% of
the cases.54
Experts attribute these disparities to long-standing inequalities that have
left Black Americans less likely to have health insurance, less likely to be
referred for virus testing when they do seek medical care, and more likely to
45.
Id.
46.
Id.
47.
Id.; see Eli Rosenburg & Andrew Van Dam, Economic Gap Between Black, White
Americans May Help Explain Protests, WASH. POST, June 2, 2020, at A21.
48.
John Eligon et al., Black Americans Face Alarming Rates of Coronavirus Infection in Some
States, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/07/us/coronavirus-race.html.
49.
Id. (Minnesota is the only state mentioned in the Article in which the percentage of Blacks
infected roughly corresponds to their percentage of the state’s population).
50.
Id.
51.
Aletha Maybank, Opinion, The Pandemic’s Missing Data, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/07/opinion/coronavirus-blacks.html.
52.
APM Research Lab Staff, The Color of Coronavirus: COVID-19 Deaths by Race and
Ethnicity in the U.S., APM RSCH. LAB (Jan. 7, 2021), https://www.apmresearchlab.org/covid/deaths-byrace; see Editors, Too Many Black American are Dying from COVID-19, SCI. AM. (Aug. 1, 2020),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/too-many-black-americans-are-dying-from-covid-19/
(noting that the “pandemic exposed a glaring health gap caused by systemic racism.”).
53.
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, ʻPandemic Within a Pandemicʼ: Coronavirus and Police Brutality
Roil Black Communities, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/
06/07/us/politics/blacks-coronavirus-police-brutality.html.
54.
COVID Data Tracker, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#demographics (last visited Jan. 15, 2021).
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live in segregated neighborhoods that lack job opportunities (requiring long
commutes on public transportation), affordable housing, and grocery stores
with healthy food.55 Low-income Black Americans do not have enough
private space to maintain the recommended six feet apart required by “social
distancing.”56 Such rules do not take their circumstances into account, or
give them any possibility of complying. Black Americans also suffer
disproportionately because they experience high levels of stress from
multiple sources, such as exposure to toxins, lack of sleep, and racial
discrimination, which can accelerate aging.57
The decline of unions and the rise of part-time work has left people with
fewer workplace protections. Unlike white collar workers, many of whom
can telecommute, Black Americans disproportionately work in sectors in
which it is not an option. 58 Nor, in general, do they have paid leave. In the
United States, 90% of those with incomes in the top quarter have paid sick
leave, in contrast to only 47% in the bottom quarter.59
Black Americans are also more likely to work in the meat packing plants
and nursing homes and to be incarcerated in the prisons, 60 that have become
hot spots throughout the United States.61 They are the bulk of the workers
deemed “essential,” i.e., excluded from lock down orders. This includes

55.
Eligon et al., supra note 48.
56.
Jason DeParle, The Coronavirus Class Divide: Space and Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/12/us/politics/coronavirus-poverty-privacy.html.
57.
Eligon et al., supra note 48.
58.
Heather Long et al., The COVID-19 Recession is the Most Unequal in Modern U.S. History,
WASH. POST (Sept. 30, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/business/coronavirusrecession-equality/; Michael Gee, Why Aren’t Black Employees Getting More White-Collar Jobs?, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Feb. 28, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/02/why-arent-black-employees-getting-more-whitecollar-jobs.
59.
Elise Gould, Lack of Paid Sick Days and Large Numbers of Uninsured Increase Risks of
Spreading the Coronavirus, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Feb. 28, 2020, 5:20 PM), https://www.epi.org/blog/lackof-paid-sick-days-and-large-numbers-of-uninsured-increase-risks-of-spreading-the-coronavirus/.
60.
Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Abolition Constitutionalism, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5 (2018)
(documenting mass incarceration of Black men); see Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Black Family in the Age of
Mass Incarceration, ATLANTIC (Oct. 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/ archive/2015/10/theblack-family-in-the-age-of-mass-incarceration/403246/; Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Refuses to Stop
Order to Move Inmates from Virus-Ravaged Prison, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/26/us/politics/supreme-court-virus-inmates.html (noting that the U.S.
Supreme Court denied a request by the Trump administration to block a trial court ruling that ordered
federal prison officials to protect 800 older or medically vulnerable inmates).
61.
See Rosenberg & Van Dam, supra note 47 (noting that Black Americans are
overrepresented in these jobs); Stephen Speranza et al., Opinion, ‘You’re on Your Own,’ Essential
Workers
are
Being
Told,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
20,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/20/opinion/osha-coronavirus.html (quoting a former official of the
Department of Labor’s enforcement arm, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA),
who says that OSHA has basically told employers and their workers, “[y]ou’re on your own.”).
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healthcare workers, grocery and pharmacy workers, delivery people,
farmworkers, and sanitation workers.62 As a critical care doctor in Boston
observed, “C[OVID]-19 has become a disease of the vulnerable.”63 Black
Americans have been “bearing the brunt of three crises—police violence,
crushing unemployment and the deadliest infectious disease threat in a
century—that has laid bare longstanding injustice.”64

2.

People on the Move

Migrants, who typically perform the low-wage work that citizens do not
want, are at tremendous risk and often beyond the ambit of workplace
regulation or health care coverage.65 Along with the tourists and business
travelers who carried the virus across borders, the International Labor
Organization estimates that almost 200 million migrant workers travel from
state to state for farm work, and other seasonal and low wage work.66
An additional 760 million workers travel internally, from one region of
their home countries to another, including forty million internal migrants
within India.67 Before the virus, these workers were respected for the
remittances they sent back to their communities.68 Now they are often
viewed as pariahs, suspected of carrying the virus.
Migrants are, in fact, disproportionately affected. In New York, for
example, as rates were declining elsewhere in the state during the last two
weeks of May, rural Sullivan County had the highest positive test rate and
the most new cases per capita. This was mostly attributed to migrant farm
workers, who often live in dormitories with shared bathrooms and dining
areas.69 Governments often exacerbate the vulnerability of people on the
move. In Singapore, migrant workers were not included in the plan to contain
62.
Gene B. Sperling, Opinion, Martin Luther King Jr. Predicted this Moment, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/24/opinion/sunday/essential-workers-wagescovid.html.
63.
Daniela J. Lamas, Opinion, The Country is Reopening. My Patients are Still Suffering., N.Y.
TIMES (May 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/29/opinion/sunday/coronavirus-nursinghomes.html.
64.
Stolberg, supra note 53.
65.
Hannah Beech, Coronavirus Finds Fuel in a World of Migrants, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/10/world/asia/coronavirus-migrants.html.
66.
Id.
67.
Id.
68.
Id. FREEFALL, supra note 29. As the UN Secretary-General noted in June, “[T]he loss of
income from COVID-19 is likely to lead to a colossal $109 billion drop in remittances. That’s the
equivalent of nearly three-quarters of all official development assistance that is no longer being sent back
home to the 800 million people who depend on it.” UN chief underlines need to protect refugees and
migrants
in
COVID-19
pandemic,
UN
NEWS
(June
3,
2020),
https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/06/1065322. See note 35, supra.
69.
Id.
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the virus, which included free testing and treatment of residents.70 Singapore
initially seemed to have the virus under control. But the number of cases
doubled to 8000 by April 20, 2020 because of new infections in the
government-built dormitories, in which up to twenty migrants shared a
“stifling” room.71 By December, data showed that 152,000 foreign workers,
or 47%, had been infected.72 Infections have dropped to near zero, but the
workers are still basically quarantined. They have been told that restrictions
will gradually be eased in 2021.73
In the United States, the CDC issued an Order Suspending the
Introduction of Certain Persons from Countries Where a Communicable
Disease Exists on March 20, 2020.74 The United States Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) deported 10,000 people, denying them entry at
the border, within roughly two months.75 These migrants, many infected by
the coronavirus, were sent to countries already overwhelmed—not only by
the virus, but by poverty and corruption as well.76
As Chris Boian, a spokesperson for the UN Refugee Agency noted,
“[the pandemic] may warrant extraordinary measures at borders, [but]
expulsion of asylum seekers resulting in refoulement should not be among
them.”77 According to the UN Network on Migration, states in many regions
have similarly closed their borders and suspended procedures for asylumseekers.78 The Network reiterated the UN Secretary-General’s call to grant

70.
Hannah Beech, Singapore Seemed to Have Coronavirus Under Control, Until Cases
Doubled, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/20/world/asia/coronavirussingapore.html.
71.
Id.
72.
Andreas Illmer, COVID-19: Singapore migrant worker infections were three times higher,
BBC NEWS (Dec. 16, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-55314862.
73.
Id.
74.
Junteng Zheng, Pandemic, Emergency Power, and Implications on the Right to Seek
Asylum,
24
AM.
SOC’Y
INT’L
L.
(May
28,
2020)
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/24/issue/13/pandemic-emergency-power-and-implications-rightseek-asylum; see Nina Lakhani, US using coronavirus pandemic to unlawfully expel asylum seekers, says
UN, GUARDIAN (Apr. 17, 2020) (noting that the “unprecedented U.S. policy authorizing the summary
expulsion of migrants and asylum seekers violates international law.”).
75.
Zheng, supra note 74.
76.
The Editorial Board, Opinion, Why Is the United States Exporting Coronavirus?, N.Y.
TIMES, (June 18, 2020) https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/18/opinion/trump-immigration-covid19deportations.html.
77.
Lakhani, supra note 74.
78.
UN Network on Migration Oﬃcial Statement on the SG’s Policy Guidance: The COVID19 Pandemic is an Opportunity to Reimagine Human Mobility, UN NETWORK ON MIGRATION (June 3,
2020), https://migrationnetwork.un.org/un-network-migration-official-statement-sgs-policy-guidancecovid-19-pandemic-opportunity-reimagine.
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temporary residence to migrants and impose a moratorium on deportations.79
But global migration from poor countries to wealthier ones has been blocked
by border closings, lockdowns, the reduction of global transportation, and
suspended asylum programs.80 According to Gillian Triggs, assistant high
commissioner for protection at the UN Refugee Agency, most governments
have temporarily shut down their asylum programs.81
III. HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE PANDEMIC
Human rights protect people from COVID-19 and other infectious
diseases by requiring their states to assure that they enjoy the “highest
attainable standard of physical and mental health,”82 and an “adequate
standard of living”83 so they can resist infection; by assuring the provision of
appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE), especially for essential
workers;84 by assuring enough living space and workspace to maintain social
distancing; by providing adequate testing and contact tracing; and by
assuring effective care for those infected.
We know that these human rights save lives and enable countries to cope
with the virus because they have done so in the other wealthy democracies.85
The universal health care available for decades in other developed states
meant that the infrastructure for testing, isolation, and treatment was already
in place. Their governments quickly assumed responsibility. South Korea,
recalling the lessons of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS),
immediately began coordinating the production of PPE. But Black
Americans and people on the move, described in Part I, cannot claim their
human rights. The following two sections explain why.

79.
Press Release, Network on Migration, Forced Returns of Migrants Must be Suspended in
Times of COVID-19, U.N. Press Release SC/6997 (May 13, 2020).
80.
Kirk Semple, As World Comes to Halt Amid Pandemic, So Do Migrants, N.Y. TIMES (May
5, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/04/world/americas/coronavirus-migrants.html.
81.
Id. (noting that only about thirty states of the 120 that have closed their borders allow
asylum seekers to file claims).
82.
ICESCR, supra note 6, arts. 6, 12.
83.
Id. art. 11.
84.
Id. art. 7(b) (“safe and healthy work conditions”).
85.
See Michelle Goldberg, Opinion, America is Too Broken To Fight the Coronavirus, N.Y.
TIMES (June 22, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/22/opinion/us-coronavirus-trump.html (noting
that “[n]o other developed country is doing as badly as the United States.”).
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Racism and America’s Rejection of Human Rights

Although the United States had been among the earliest proponents of
international human rights,86 it soon abandoned the project. Its rejection of
international human rights was led in the 1950s by southern conservatives in
Congress.87 They insisted that international human rights violated states’
rights.88 What they meant was that the law’s prohibitions against racial
discrimination would bar still-legal segregation in the South. They were
right.
An excerpt from the debate in the United States Senate Foreign
Relations Subcommittee on the Genocide Convention sets out their concerns:
. . . If there is to be a succession of treaties from the United Nations
dealing with domestic questions, are we ready to surrender the
power of the States over such matters to the Federal Government?
. . . The report of the Civil Rights Committee appointed by the
President . . . in two places refers to the added power which may
be given to Congress in the field of civil rights if the human-rights
treaty is ratified and approved.89

Congress was not “ready to surrender the power of the states over [civil
rights] to the Federal Government”—and certainly not to the United Nations.
Senator Bricker of Ohio proposed an amendment to the Constitution, which
would require Congressional legislation before any treaty could become law
in the United States.90 As Louis Henkin noted, this would have made all
treaties non-self-executing.91 The Bricker Amendment was narrowly
defeated by “vigorous lobbying by the Eisenhower Administration and its
concomitant undertaking . . . not to adhere to human rights treaties.”92

86.
MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 9 (2001).
87.
Natalie H. Kaufman & David Whiteman, Opposition to Human Rights Treaties in the
United States Senate: The Legacy of the Bricker Amendment, 10 HUM. RTS. Q. 309, 311 (1988).
88.
Id. at 313, 315, 323.
89.
The Genocide Convention, Hearings Before A Subcomm. of the S. Comm. Sess. 208 (1950)
(statement of Carl B. Rix, Vice Chairman of Special Comm. on Peace and Law Through United Nations
of the American Bar Association).
90.
Kaufman & Whiteman, supra note 87, at 309, 310, 313–316, 324.
91.
Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator
Bricker (editorial comments), 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 341, 348 (1995).
92.
LOUIS B. SOHN & THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 964–65 (1973).
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The executive branch was more worried about the international reaction
to domestic racism.93 The Soviets distributed photographs of the police
attacking civil rights marchers, with fire hoses and German shepherds,
throughout the Third World.94 People in the newly independent states were
appalled. Desegregation became a Cold War imperative, as the United States
noted in its amicus brief in Brown v. Board of Education.95
Nor was America receptive to economic rights in the 1950s. Economic
rights were viewed as both dangerous—a deceptively benign form of
communism that would subvert and destroy American initiative—and
demeaning, “handouts” inimical to self-respect. The rhetoric of opportunity,
the get-rich-quick promise of the American Dream, made economic rights
seem superfluous. America was the richest country in the world.
White Americans did not need economic rights because they were
already the beneficiaries of massive, generous government spending
programs. The G.I. Bill assured white American men who had served in
World War II re-entry into civilian life. “No other New Deal initiative had
as great an impact on changing the country. Aimed at reintegrating sixteen
million veterans, it reached eight of ten men born during the 1920s.”96
Between 1944 and 1971, $95 billion was invested in the “model welfare
system” it created.97 More than 200,000 used the G.I. Bill’s access to capital
to buy farms and start businesses.98 Five million veterans were able to get
mortgages for new houses in the suburbs. It was a phenomenal success for
white Americans.
While the G.I. Bill was technically available to Black veterans, it was
administered locally. In the south, “95 percent of Black veterans used their
higher education benefits” in segregated colleges.99 None of these schools
were research universities and fewer than 5% were accredited by the
American Association of University Professors (AAUP).100 Although Blacks
comprised 25% of the population in the south, white schools outnumbered

93.
Vicki Goldberg, Remembering the Faces in the Civil Rights Struggle, N.Y. TIMES (July 17,
1994),
https://www.nytimes.com/1994/07/17/arts/photography-view-remembering-the-faces-in-thecivil-rights-struggle.html.
94.
Id.
95.
Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61, 62–63
(1988); see Brief for American Civil Liberties Union et al., Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I) 347
U.S. 483 (1954) (No. 08) (explaining that, “Soviet spokesmen [are using the] undeniable existence of
racial discrimination [as] propaganda warfare.”).
96.
Ira Katznelson, When Is Affirmative Action Fair? On Grievous Harms and Public Remedies,
73 SOC. RSCH. 541, 566 (2006).
97.
Id.
98.
Id.
99.
Id. at 553.
100. Id. at 554.
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Black schools by more than five to one.101 Many of the Black schools were
small with fewer than 250 students.102 Twenty-thousand Black applicants
were denied admission because there was no room for them.103 Fannie Mae
mortgage loans, similarly, made it possible for white families to buy a house
in the suburbs. Black families were explicitly excluded from the new suburbs
by residential red-lining. As Ira Katznelson has shown, “there was . . . no
greater instrument for widening an already huge racial gap in postwar
America than the G.I. Bill.” 104
Many in the Civil Rights Movement understood that economic rights
were necessary for racial equality. Martin Luther King, Jr., drafted an
“economic and social Bill of Rights,” which included “the right . . . to a
decent job . . . the right to a minimum income . . . [and] the right to an
adequate education.”105 Internationalists and progressives urged the United
States to recognize the full range of human rights set out in the Universal
Declaration. They were persecuted by Senator Joseph McCarthy and his
followers.106 The United States did not ratify the Civil Covenant and the
Race Convention until the early 1990s, when the Cold War was over. Even
then, the ratifications had caveats that assured the treaties would have no
effect. The southern segregationists had prevailed. The United States is the
only industrialized democracy that is still not a party to the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child.107
B.

The United States Campaign Against Communism in Latin America

The people on the move described in Part I, at least those seeking to stay
in the United States or to seek asylum here, cannot claim their human rights
because the United States will not allow them to do so. These deportations
are especially egregious because of the Unites States’ historical support of
101. Katznelson, supra note 96, at 553.
102. Id. at 554.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 553.
105. Martin Luther King, Jr., Economic & Social Bill of Rights, (Feb. 6, 1968),
https://www.crmvet.org/docs/68ebr.htm.
106. See, e.g., Beverly Gage, What an Uncensored Letter to M.L.K. Reveals, N.Y. TIMES MAG.
(Nov. 11, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/16/magazine/what-an-uncensored-letter-to-mlkreveals.html (describing the F.B.I.’s smear campaign against Martin Luther King Jr.); see generally
RICHARD M. FREELAND, THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE AND THE ORIGINS OF MCCARTHYISM (1972).
107. See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 6; see also ICESCR, supra note 6; ICCPR, supra note
6; CERD, supra note 6; CEDAW, supra note 6; CRC, supra note 6; UN Human Rights Office of the High
Commissioner, Status of Ratifications Interactive Dashboard, OHCHR, https://indicators.ohchr.org (last
visited Sept. 29, 2020).
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right-wing authoritarian regimes in Latin America, which forced immigrants
to flee to the United States from a violent, corrupt, and impoverished region.
In a new book, The Jakarta Method: Washington’s Anticommunism Crusade
and the Mass Murder Program That Shaped Our World,108 Vincent Bevins
draws on recently declassified government documents to describe the role of
the United States in the Indonesian Army’s “annihilation” of the Communist
Party.109 “Jakarta,” he shows, became a code word in Brazil and Chile.
Testimony before Brazil’s Truth Commission after the fall of its rightwing dictatorship established that the “Jakarta Operation” there referred to
the mass murder of communists.110 Graffiti with the message “Jakarta is
coming,” or simply “Yakarta,” appeared throughout the region. It meant
“anti-communist mass murder and the state-organized extermination of
civilians who opposed . . . capitalist authoritarian regimes loyal to the United
States. . . . [Jakarta] would be employed far and wide in Latin America over
the two decades that followed.”111 The United States’ efforts to undermine
communist regimes in Latin America also included what the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) held was America’s illegal use of force against
Nicaragua in Nicaragua v. United States,112 as well as its role in the
overthrow of the democratically elected President of Chile, Salvador
Allende, and its support for General Augusto Pinochet, the dictator who
replaced him.113

108. See generally VINCENT BEVINS, THE JAKARTA METHOD: WASHINGTON’S
ANTICOMMUNISM CRUSADE AND THE MASS MURDER PROGRAM THAT SHAPED OUR WORLD (Hatchett
Book Group) (2020) [hereinafter JAKARTA METHOD].
109. Id. at 139–40, 156–57; Vincent Bevins, How ‘Jakarta’ Became the Codeword for U.S.
Backed
Mass
Killing,
N.Y.
REV.
BOOKS
(May
18,
2020),
https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2020/05/18/how-jakarta-became-the-codeword-for-us-backed-masskilling/?lp_txn_id=1039785 (stating that, ‘Operation Annihilation’ was the Indonesian Army’s name for
the campaign in which “between five hundred thousand and one million people were slaughtered, and one
million more were herded into concentration camps.” While conceding that, “The prime responsibility
for the massacres and the concentration camps lies with the Indonesian military,” Bevins insists that, “The
United States was part and parcel of the operation at every stage.”).
110. Id. at 193–94.
111. Id. at 199–200.
112. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment,
1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 9, 15, 25, 26(g) (June 27).
113. JAKARTA METHOD, supra note 108, at 200–01, 203; see generally Frederic L. Kirgis,
Possible Indictment of Pinochet in the United States, 51 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. (Mar. 13, 2000)
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/5/issue/3/possible-indictment-pinochet-united-states; Support SOA
Watch, SOAW (Jan. 1, 2021) https://soaw.org/support-soa-watch-today (“The SOA Watch staff collective
is spread across continents, working with allies and compass throughout the Americas on everything from
reports documenting the impacts of US trained, funded and supported state officials; to organizing virtual
spaces for popular education.”).
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IV. TOWARD A MORE AUTHENTIC COMMITMENT TO HUMAN RIGHTS
This Part begins with two theories that support the more vigorous
approach to human rights that the current crises demand. It then proposes a
new theory, intercountry human rights, intended to globalize human rights
through ad hoc arrangements between states. It concludes by proposing two
concrete legal reforms for the United States.
A.

Theories to Support More Robust Human Rights

Vulnerability theory and reparations theory are both familiar to
international lawyers. These recent iterations differ from the traditional
international lawyers’ understanding in ways that support the deeper
commitment to human rights needed now.

1.

Vulnerability Theory

The core insight of vulnerability theory is that “vulnerability is . . .
inherent in the human condition”; we are all vulnerable in different ways and
at different times in our lives.114 As a corollary, the notion that only some
groups are “vulnerable” is “not only misleading and inaccurate, it is also
pernicious” because it suggests that other groups are not.115 Under
vulnerability theory, in contrast, the state has an affirmative obligation to
recognize and address the multiple vulnerabilities of its people.116
Although the term “vulnerability theory” was coined in the twenty-first
century, human vulnerability has been addressed in human rights law since
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948.117 Article 6, for
example, recognizes everyone’s “right to recognition everywhere as a person
before the law.”118 Article 22 recognizes the right to social security and the
right to the “realization . . . of economic, social and cultural rights
indispensable for his dignity.”119 Article 23.3 recognizes that “everyone who
works has the right to . . . [remuneration] . . . ensuring for himself and his

114. Equality in the Human Condition, supra note 9, at 1.
115. Id. at 3; Martha Albertson Fineman, Equality, Autonomy, and the Vulnerable Subject in Law
and Politics, in VULNERABILITY: REFLECTIONS ON A NEW ETHICAL FOUNDATION FOR LAW AND POLITICS
13, 16 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Anna Grear eds. 2013).
116. Equality in the Human Condition, supra note 9, at 20–21.
117. See generally G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 6; Robert Andorno, Is Vulnerability the
Foundation of Human Rights, in HUMAN DIGNITY OF THE VULNERABLE IN THE AGE OF RIGHTS:
INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 257, 258 (Aniceto Masferrer & Emilio Garcia-Sanchez eds., 2016)
[hereinafter Vulnerability the Foundation of Human Rights].
118. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 6, art. 6.
119. Id. art. 22.
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family existence worthy of human dignity,”120 and Article 25 recognizes that
if a person cannot work; because of unemployment, sickness, disability, old
age or other reason; he still has a right to security.121 These rights and others,
including the rights to an adequate standard of living,122 to be free from
hunger,123 and the right to the “highest attainable standard of physical and
mental health”124 are spelled out in detail in the legally binding Economic
Covenant.125 Additional rights, recognizing the specific vulnerabilities of
women and children, are set out in the Women’s Convention and the CRC. 126
Vulnerability theory extends the scope of those for whom the state is
responsible. Under the human rights treaties, the state is responsible only for
the specific parties, and in the specific contexts, set out in the treaties. The
treaties, moreover, are binding only on ratifying parties, and even then, only
to the extent accepted by the state. Under vulnerability theory, in contrast,
vulnerability is universal.

2.

Abolition Theory

Reparations have a long history in international law. They are due
whenever a state is in breach of a legal obligation. They may take the form
of compensation, restitution, apology, or other form of satisfaction. In The
Alabama Arbitration, for example, Great Britain paid the United States
$15,500,000 for its breach of neutrality during the American Civil War.127
Under recent iterations of reparations theory propounded by the Black
Lives Matter movement, however, reparations have been explicitly linked to
the abolition of the original harm upon which the reparations are based.128
As Patrisse Cullors describes it, this enables those seeking to eliminate
destructive institutions to situate the harm in a social and political context.129

120. Id. art. 23, ¶ 3.
121. Id. art. 25.
122. ICESCR, supra note 6, art. 11, ¶ 1.
123. Id.
124. Id. art. 12.
125. See generally ICESCR, supra note 6.
126. See, e.g., CEDAW, supra note 6, arts. 5–6 (requiring state to “ensure that family education
includes a proper understanding of maternity as a social function and the recognition of the common
responsibility of men and women in the upbringing and development of their children” and “to suppress
all forms of traffic in women and exploitation of prostitution of women” Id.).; CRC, supra note 6, arts. 7,
¶ 1, 24, ¶ 2 (“The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to a
name, the right to acquire a nationality and, as far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or
her parents.” Id. art. 7, ¶ 1. As well as “To diminish infant and child mortality[.]” Id. art. 24, ¶ 2(a)).
127. MARK WESTON JANIS, AMERICA AND THE LAW OF NATIONS 1776–1939 131–33 (2010).
128. See, e.g., Cullors, supra note 10, at 1686; Roberts, supra note 60, at 30.
129. Cullors, supra note 10, at 1687.

351926-ILSA_International_27-2_Text.indd 45

3/26/21 12:35 PM

ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 27.2

268

She offers a graphic example.130 Her brother, a 6’2” Black man weighing
almost three hundred pounds, was discharged from prison with a diagnosis
of mental illness, but his family was not informed.131 They were terrified
when he started to hallucinate and did not know where he was.132 They called
for the Psychiatric Emergency Team, which arrived and promptly called the
police.133 Her brother dropped to his knees, hands in the air, “plead[ing] with
the officers for his life.”134 Cullors was able to persuade the officers to leave,
and her brother eventually agreed to go to the hospital. As Cullors concludes,
“[a]bolition means not having the police as first responders to mental and
emotional health crises.”135 Rather, she suggests, “[a]bolition fights to ensure
that all families have access to adequate and quality health services.”136
Those seeking to abolish prisons, for example, may seek reparations for
mass incarceration even as they work toward its abolition. The key is to
avoid measures that perpetuate that which is to be eradicated, rather than
dismantle or diminish it. As Angel Sanchez explains, “I understand this
[Essay] may not be abolitionist enough for some . . . [but] after serving over
a decade in prison . . . I yearn to . . . alleviate the inhumane treatment of the
imprisoned . . . I believe that the prison system is like a social cancer: we
should fight to eradicate it but never stop treating those affected by it.”137
Framing reparations for human rights violations as a measure taken
toward the abolition of such violations, similarly, is important for symbolic
and educational reasons. But it is also important to apply those reparations to
the remediation of the actual harm caused by the violations and to the
prevention of future violations. The ICJ found that the United States had an
obligation to pay reparations in The Nicaragua Case, for example.138 But
Nicaragua later abandoned its claim, presumably in response to United States
pressure to do so in exchange for foreign aid.139 If the United States wanted
to repair its relationship with Nicaragua, and the region, it might have instead
accepted responsibility for its earlier violations, and framed the same
exchange not only as reparations but as a commitment to the abolition of the
illegal use of force.

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 1689.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Cullors, supra note 10, at 1689.
Id.
Id.
Angel E. Sanchez, In Spite of Prison, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1650, 1652 (2019).
MARK WESTON JANIS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 804 (6th ed. 2020).
Id. at 805.
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A Theory of Intercountry Human Rights

Intercountry human rights would effectively merge the participating
states into a single functioning unit for purposes of assuring specific, agreedupon human rights. The legal mechanism for accomplishing this could be a
simple protocol to a pre-existing treaty to which they were both parties, such
as a friendship, commerce, and navigation treaty (FCN) treaty or, if there
were more than two states, the relevant human rights treaty.
The terms of the agreements would vary according to the interests,
needs, histories, and geographies of their state parties. There are several
reasons states might accede to such treaties, and more broadly, embrace the
notion of intercountry human rights, as set out below. These treaties would
find support in vulnerability theory, abolition theory, and the growing
recognition that human rights violations, like viruses, ignore political borders
in a globalized world.
A strong version of intercountry human rights would be a multilateral
treaty or protocol in which states recognize that all activities involving
international law would be subject to international human rights law.140
Disputes would be resolved by the ICJ. In other words, if an activity involved
goods, services, or persons of more than one state, or any form of
international commerce or investment, human rights would have to be
assured at every step of the process, for everyone involved. Rich countries,
for example, could not corner the market on a COVID-19 vaccine because it
would violate the right to health of those unable to afford it.141 A person
ordering shoes from China would know that workers’ rights were protected
in the factories in which they were made, and that toxic by-products of
industrialization were not lowering the life expectancy of the people who
lived in the region. A strong version of intercountry human rights, in short,
would eliminate the “siloing” of human rights documented and deplored by
Alston.142
Intercountry human rights are not an alternative to international human
rights, understood as the UN-centered system, but an addition. It would draw

140. See ICESCR, supra note 6; ICCPR, supra note 6; CERD, supra note 6; CEDAW, supra
note 6; CRC, supra note 6.
141. See, e.g., Megan Twohey et al., With First Dibs on Vaccines, Rich Countries Have ‘Cleared
the Shelves’, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/15/us/coronavirus-vaccinedoses-reserved.html?searchResultPosition=2; Matt Apuzzo & Selam Gebrekidan, For COVID-19
Vaccines, Some are Rich and too Poor, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020
/12/28/world/africa/covid-19-vaccines-south africa.html?searchResultPosition=1 (last updated Dec. 30,
2020).
142. Extreme Inequality, supra note 13; Philip Alston, Universal Basic Income, in T HE FUTURE
OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 377, 379 (Katherine Young ed. 2019).
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on developments in that system, such as recent research showing that state
reporting to human rights treaty bodies is linked to better rights practices.143
There is no need for any theoretical justification for the mechanism
proposed here; it is simply an agreement between, or among, consenting
states. There is no encroachment on state sovereignty. Rather, like any other
international agreement, it is a voluntary surrender of some sovereignty, in
recognition of a greater common good.
B.

Legal Reforms for the United States

This section suggests how the United States could apply the theories set
out above. These are merely sketches, set out for purposes of illustration, but
they are intended to serve as sketches for actual, concrete proposals. While
vulnerability theory and abolition theory apply to both Black Americans and
people on the move, the focus in the first subsection, below, is on Black
Americans. Intercountry human rights could apply, in theory, to all people
on the move. Here, more specifically, the theory is considered in the context
of those harmed by the United States’ anti-communism campaigns in Latin
America and to those deported there during the pandemic.

1.

Fulfil America’s Early Promise

The United States can begin by revoking its prior declarations that the
ICCPR and the Race Convention were “non-self-executing.”144 It can then
join the other industrialized democracies by ratifying the remaining major
human rights treaties without stipulating that they will have no legal effect.145
This may seem overly ambitious, especially in view of our historical
antipathy to human rights. But there are three reasons why these measures,
which the other industrialized democracies adopted decades ago, may finally
be within reach. First, our historical antipathy to human rights was deeply
grounded in a virulent form of racism that growing numbers of Americans,
especially young Americans, now find repugnant.146 Americans in every
143. Cosette D. Creamer & Beth A. Simmons, The Proof is in the Process: Self-Reporting Under
International Human Rights Treaties, 114 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 1 (2020).
144. See, e.g., Penny M. Venetis, Making Human Rights Treaty Law Actionable in the United
States: The Case for Universal Implementing Legislation, 63 ALA. L. REV. 98, 98–99 (2011).
145. Id.
146. See, e.g., Nate Cohn & Kevin Quealy, How Public Opinion Has Moved on Black Lives
Matter, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/06/10/upshot/blacklives-matter-attitudes.html (noting that “in recent weeks, American voters’ support for Black Lives Matter
increased almost as much as it had in the preceding two years”). Id.; Astead W. Herndon & Dionne
Searcey, How Trump and the Black Lives Matter Movement Changed White Votersʼ Minds, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/27/us/politics/trump-biden-protests-polling.html (last updated July 3,
2020).
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state demonstrated against the murder of George Floyd and other Black
Americans by the police this year.147 These murders, and the Black Lives
Matter movement, have produced a “seismic shift” in American views on
racism.148 Along with the pandemic, and its economic costs, “[i]deas that
would have been considered too liberal for most Democrats a few months
ago are now being proposed by Republicans.”149
Second, “human rights” have become part of mainstream discourse, in
part thanks to Bernie Sanders.150 As then President-elect Joe Biden noted in
a speech on December 10, 2020, Human Rights Day, he is receptive:
This year, amid a pandemic and global protests, we are reminded
of how much work remains to be done to root out the systemic
inequities that continue to cut short lives and imperil livelihoods.
And as we work . . . to advance human rights globally, we must
also recognize that our task begins at home. Every American —
regardless of race, ethnicity, zip code, religion, sex, sexual
orientation, gender identity, or disability — should be free to
flourish in a society that values and defends equal justice for all.
We must lead by the power of our example.151

Third, the idea that it is the state’s responsibility to assure the well-being
of its people, and that the state is in fact capable of doing so, has been
rehabilitated.152 Nobel-prize winning economist Paul Krugman recently
cited Ronald Reagan: “the most terrifying words in English are ‘I’m from

147. See, e.g., Damien Cave, Livia Albeck-Ripka, & Iliana Magra, Huge Crowds Around the
Globe March in Solidarity Against Police Brutality, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/06/world/george-floyd-global-protests.html (Protesters throughout
the world took to the streets in solidarity).
148. Giovanni Russonello, Why Most Americans Support the Protests, N.Y. TIMES (June 5,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/05/us/politics/polling-george-floyd-protests-racism.html.
149. Perry Bacon Jr., The Pandemic Has Pushed Biden To The Left. How Far Will He Go?,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (May 21, 2010), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-pandemic-has-pushed-bidento-the-left-how-far-will-he-go/.
150. Sydney Ember, Bernie Sanders Went to Canada, and a Dream of ‘Medicare for All’
Flourished, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/09/us/politics/berniesanders-health-care.html.
151. Press Release, Joe Biden, Biden-Harris Transition, Statement by President-elect Joe Biden
on Human Rights Day (Dec. 10, 2020) (on file at https://buildbackbetter.gov/press-releases/statement-bypresident-elect-joe-biden-on-human-rights-day).
152. See BROWN, supra note 39, at 131; Government’s Responsibility for Public Health,
MINNESOTA
DEPT.
HEALTH,
https://www.health.state.mn.us/communities/practice/resources
/chsadmin/mnsystem-responsibility.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2021).
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the government, and I’m here to help.’”153 But this year, Krugman continues,
“the government was there to help – and help it did.”154
This is not to suggest that racism is not an ongoing—and deadly—
nightmare in this country.155 Or that even Americans who believe that health
care is a human right are ready to recognize federally-funded, equal
education as a human right.156 Or that seventy-one million people did not
vote for Donald Trump.157 But COVID-19, and its ongoing economic fallout,
seems to have taught us something about our own vulnerability.158

2.

Intercountry Human Rights

Intercountry human rights, applied in this context, could require the
United States to take responsibility for its historical support of repressive
regimes in Latin America, as well as its more recent illegal deportations of
10,000 immigrants to the region, many already infected with the virus. One
approach might be to establish a joint commission with the affected states to
determine reparations.
President Biden might be particularly well-prepared for such a project.
As his longtime friend, Senator Tom Carper of Delaware, recently observed,
“[Biden] believes that we—the U.S.— are the root cause of much of the
violence and crime and lack of opportunity in . . . Central America.”159

153. Paul Krugman, Opinion, 2020 Was the Year Reaganism Died, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/28/opinion/reagan-economy-covid.html; Paul Krugman – Facts,
NOBEL PRIZE, https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/2008/krugman/facts/ (last visited
Jan. 28, 2021); see Jason DeParle, Vast Federal Aid Has Capped Rise in Poverty, Studies Find, N.Y.
TIMES (June 22, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/21/us/politics/coronavirus-poverty.html.
154. Krugman, supra note 153.
155. See,
e.g.,
Police
Violence
Map,
MAPPING
POLICE
VIOLENCE,
https://mappingpoliceviolence.org/ (last updated Feb. 16, 2021).
156. See, e.g., Equality of Educational Opportunity, STAN. ENCYC. PHIL. (May 31, 21017),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/equal-ed-opportunity/; see generally Mary Gerisch, Health Care as a
Human
Right,
A.B.A.,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/
human_rights_magazine_home/the-state-of-healthcare-in-the-united-states/health-care-as-a-humanright/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2021).
157. Margaret Renkl, Opinion, 71 Million People Voted for Trump. They’re Not Going
Anywhere. N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/09/opinion/trump-bidennation-divided.html.
158. Roberts, supra note 60 (As Dorothy Roberts reminds us, quoting Angela Y. Davis, “You
have to act as if it were possible to radically transform the world. And you have to do it all the time.”).
159. Christian Paz, The Biden Doctrine Begins with Latin America, ATLANTIC (Oct. 26, 2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2020/10/joe-biden-foreign-policy-latinamerica/616841/.
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Carper is certain that Biden would “make sure we do a better job.”160 Biden
believes that “we have a moral responsibility, having created havoc in
[Central and South America].”161 Foreign aid, of course, is not the same as
recognizing a legal obligation to support human rights in a foreign country.
But it could be a beginning.
V.

CONCLUSION

This Article has explained why COVID-19 targets the poor and why
this is a matter of human rights. It has argued that the current crises demand
a deeper, more authentic commitment to human rights and drawn on
vulnerability theory, abolition theory, and a new theory of ‘intercountry’
human rights to support this commitment. Finally, it has proposed two legal
reforms to realize it.
We are living in a world of staggering economic inequality, in which
some lives matter and others do not. America has played a significant role
in creating this world, in part by violating the human rights of Black
Americans and “people on the move.” This Article has argued that America
should take responsibility for these violations and suggested how we might
begin.

160. Id. (On March 15, 2020, Biden said he would impose a moratorium of deportation of
immigrants for the first hundred days of his administration, after which deportations would be limited to
people convicted of felonies); Melissa Gomez, Biden Commits to Moratorium on Deportations of
Immigrants, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2020-03-15/joe-bidenbernie-sanders-deportations-coronavirus-healthcare.
161. Paz, supra note 159.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

This essay is based on my presentation at the 2020 International Law
Weekend, organized by the American Branch of the International Law
Association (ABILA). 1 As such, this essay is not intended to be an
exhaustive survey, but rather an overview of the main issues of interest. In
addition, this work specifically discusses potential upcoming progress
regarding international climate policies and potential setbacks.2 Therefore,


Carolina Arlota is a Visiting Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Oklahoma,
College of Law. Her contact address is: carolarlota@ou.edu. The author would like to thank Alexandra
Moore, Erica Jimenez, Jessica Velardi, Michaela Roselli, Michael Brito, Melissa Nunez, Samantha Harris,
and Magdalena Lewandowska for their outstanding work. The views presented here are those of the
author.
1.
This essay is based on the author’s presentation titled The Paris Agreement on Climate
Change in the Aftermath of the Pandemic: Challenges and Possibilities, which was presented on October
23, 2020 at the “COVID-19 and Climate Change: A Setback or Strengthening the Resolve to Move
Forward?” panel.
2.
Molly Bergen & Helen Mountford, 6 Signs of Progress Since the Adoption of the Paris
Agreement, WORLD RES. INST. (Dec. 8, 2020), https://www.wri.org/blog/2020/12/paris-agreementprogress-climate-action.
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this essay advances current knowledge on international energy law and
fosters its academic autonomy.
On March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared
COVID-19 a pandemic.3 At the time, not much was known about the virus.4
Stringent measures imposing social distancing and closing all non-essential
businesses were implemented around the globe in a joint effort to contain the
virus, buying time for scientists, hospitals and medical workers to prepare.5
Against this background, an economic crisis started to develop based on a
drop in oil prices, due to the price war between Russia and Saudi Arabia.6
This economic crisis and the draining of financial resources made the
pandemic more severe. 7 At the same time, comparisons between the
pandemic and the climate crisis began to occur, with few paying attention to
the urgency and stringency of the measures to be taken.8 The pandemic and
climate crisis are also connected from a policy perspective because pollution,
such as greenhouse gases (GHGs), adversely impacts the immune and
respiratory systems, making individuals more vulnerable to the COVID-19
virus.9
3.
Tedros Adhanom, Director General, Remarks at the Media Briefing on COVID-19 (Mar.
11, 2020).
4.
James Gallagher, Coronavirus: What we still don’t know about Covid-19, BBC (Mar. 29,
2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/health-52006988.
5.
See generally Policy Responses to COVID-19, IMF, https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imfand-covid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19 (last visited Jan. 14, 2021) (providing a compiled list of all
of the stringent policies that have been implemented in response to COVID-19, such as social distancing
and business closure).
6.
An unprecedented global health and economic crisis, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY,
https://www.iea.org/topics/covid-19 (last visited on Jan. 11, 2021) (contending that global oil and gas
markets were facing an unprecedented situation of collapsing demand with an already abundant supply
that continues to increase because of the pandemic as well); Clifford Krauss & Stanley Reed, Oil Prices
Dive as Saudi Arabia Takes Aim at Russian Production, N.Y. T IMES (Mar. 8, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/08/business/saudi-arabia-oil-prices.html.
7.
REBECCA ENGEBRESTEN, THE IMPACT OF CORONAVIRUS (COVID-19) AND THE GLOBAL
OIL PRICE SHOCK ON THE FISCAL POSITION OF OIL-EXPORTING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, OECD (Sept.
30, 2020), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/view/?ref=136_136801-aw9nps8afk&title=The-impact-ofCoronavirus-COVID-19-and-the-global-oil-price-shock-on-the-fiscal-position-of-oil-exportingdeveloping-countries.
8.
Owen Jones, Why Don’t We Treat Climate Crisis with the Same Urgency as Coronavirus,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 5, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/mar/05/governmentscoronavirus-urgent-climate-crisis. There were exceptions early on. While coronavirus is “understandably
treated as an imminent danger, the climate crisis is still presented as an abstraction whose consequences
are decades away. Unlike an illness, it is harder to visualize how climate breakdown will affect us each
as individuals,” and society as a whole. Id. at 2.
9.
JASON A. SCHWARTZ, INST. POL’Y INTEGRITY, WEAKING OUR DEFENSES: HOW THE
TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S DEREGULATORY PUSH HAS EXACERBATED THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC, 4–6
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This essay focuses on the challenges that arose due to the pandemic and
how policy makers may take advantage of the economic and health crises to
rapidly advance a greener economy.10 Steering a transition from fossil fuels
to non-carbon-based sources should be an important consideration after the
COVID-19 pandemic, along with the pressing concerns of justice also
triggered by the pandemic.11 In this regard, this essay discusses the main
treaties on international energy law. 12 These treaties are aligned with
international commitments, most prominently the United Nations
Sustainable Development Goals (SDG).13 Sustainable Development Goal 13
promotes the need for immediate and effective climate action (SDG 13).14
This is relevant as the synergistic nature of climate threats has not been fully
assessed, and the outcomes are likely to be worse than the sum of the
independent parts.15
On its own, the COVID-19 pandemic is unlikely to meaningfully reduce
carbon emissions. 16 The International Energy Agency (IEA) warns that,
unless investments are made in “cleaner and more resilient energy
infrastructure[s]”, total emissions may rebound, as has happened after
previous economic crashes, to higher levels than before the crisis.17 Recent
(July
10,
2020),
https://policyintegrity.org/files/publications/Weakening_Our_Defenses_Covid_Deregulation_Report.pdf
; Ingmar Schumacher, Perspectives on the Economics of the Environment in the Shadow of Coronavirus,
76 ENV’T. RES. ECON. 465, 465 (2020); Jerry A. Nathanson, Air Pollution, Major Air Pollutants:
Greenhouse Gases, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/science/air-pollution (last updated
Oct. 19, 2020).
10.

OECD, MAKING THE GREEN RECOVERY WORK FOR JOBS, INCOME, AND GROWTH 2 (2020).

11.
KARL NIETVELT ET AL., S&P GLOBAL, THE ENERGY TRANSITION AND COVID-19: A
PIVOTAL MOMENT FOR CLIMATE POLICIES AND ENERGY COMPANIES (2020).
12.
Paris Agreement art. 1, Dec. 12, 2015, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev/ [hereinafter
Paris Agreement]; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2(1)(a), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
13.
Goal 13: Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts, UNITED NATIONS,
https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2021).
14.

Id.

15.
See O. Hoegh-Guldberg et al., The Human Imperative of Stabilizing Global Climate Change
at 1.5°C, 365 SCI. 1, 1 (2019), https://science.sciencemag.org/content/365/6459/eaaw6974.
16.
Piers M. Foster et al., Current and Future Global Climate Impacts Resulting from COVID19, 10 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 913, 913 (2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/s41558-020-0883-0
(emphasizing that, in the absence of long-term system-wide decarbonization of economies, major shifts
in behavior are insufficient to achieve anything but modest reductions); see also Carolina Arlota, The
United States Climate Change Policies and COVID-19: Poisoning the Cure, P ACE L. REV. (forthcoming
2021).
17.

GLOBAL ENERGY REVIEW 2020: THE IMPACTS OF THE COVID-19 CRISIS ON GLOBAL
AND
CO2
EMISSIONS,
INT’L
ENERGY
AGENCY
(2020),
https://www.iea.org/reports/global-energy-review-2020.

ENERGY

DEMAND
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empirical studies show that the immediate climate effects of pandemicrelated restrictions are close to negligible, and lasting effects, if any, will be
dependent upon the recovery strategy that is adopted in the medium-term.18
Furthermore, carbon dioxide emissions are expected to quickly rebound.19
According to a recent report by the United Nations Environment
Programme, carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions will decrease in 2020. 20
Nonetheless, the “[r]esulting atmospheric concentrations of major GHGs
(CO2, methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O)) continued to increase in both
2019 and 2020.”21 To stabilize global warming, continuous reductions in
emissions are required to achieve net-zero CO2.22 Once such net-zero GHGs
emissions are achieved, the planet will first experience a peak and only later
will a decline in global warming occur.23
In such a scenario, the need for the reduction of both carbon emissions
and GHGs is extremely pressing.24 There is an international set of treaties
targeting such reductions.25 For example, the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 26 and its corollary, the Paris
Agreement on Climate Change,27 have the reduction of carbon emissions and
GHGs as their main objectives.28 In 2015, the Twenty-First Conference of

18.
Corinne Le Quéré et al., Temporary Reduction in Daily CO2 Emissions during the COVID19
forced
Confinement,
10
NATURE
CLIMATE
CHANGE
647,
647
(2020),
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41558-020-0797-x.
19.
Id. at 650.
20.
U.N. Env’t Programme, Emissions Gap Report 2020: Exec. Summary, U.N. Doc.
DEW/2310/NA,
at
5
(2020),
https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/34438/EGR20ESE.pdf?sequence=8 [hereinafter
Emissions Gap Report 2020].
21.
Id.
22.
Id.
23.
Id.
24.
Id. at 7.
25.
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2;
Dec. 10, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]; Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer art. 1, Sep. 16, 1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol].
26.
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, Sept. 5, 1992, S. TREATY
DOC NO. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter United Nations Framework]. The UNFCCC entered
into force on March 21, 1994. The scientific consensus regarding the existence of climate change was a
paramount consideration during UNFCCC negotiations. John Houghton, Science and International
Environmental Policy: The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, in ENV’T. L., THE ECONOMY
AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 355–57 (Richard Revesz et al. eds., 2001).
27.
See Paris Agreement, supra note 12, art. 2. The Paris Agreement, with its goal of reducing
GHGs, was negotiated following the legal framework of the UNFCCC, a treaty with 196 state parties to
which the Senate gave its advice and consent in 1992. Harold Hongju Koh, The Trump Administration
and International Law, 56 WASHBURN L. J. 413, 435 (2019).
28.

See Paris Agreement, supra note 12; see also United Nations Framework, supra note 26.
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the Parties of the UNFCCC enacted the Paris Agreement,29 an agreement that
specifically aims to contain the rising global average temperature to well
below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, while advancing efforts to cap the
temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.30
The main international obligations of the parties to the Paris Agreement
are their financial contributions to the Green Climate Fund 31 and the
fulfillment of each country’s “nationally determined contributions.”32 As the
language of the treaty conveys, both are voluntarily established commitments
determined by each country, exclusively.33 Under international law, the Paris
Agreement is unequivocally a treaty; as such, it requires signatories to
comply with its terms.34
II.

THE IMPACT OF COVID-19 FOR INTERNATIONAL ENERGY LAW AND
THE PARIS AGREEMENT ON CLIMATE CHANGE

This part discusses the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic for
international energy law and, more specifically, for the Paris Agreement.
This part is based on the assumption that conflicts in international energy
law, including climate policy, do not primarily occur because of the absence
29.
See Paris Agreement, supra note 12. For an overview about the Paris Agreement, see, e.g.,
The
Paris
Agreement,
Summary,
CLIMATE
FOCUS
1,
1
(Dec.
28,
2015),
https://www.climatefocus.com/sites/default/files/20151228%20COP%2021%20briefing%20FIN.pdf;
see also Houghton, supra note 26, at 355–57.
30.

See Paris Agreement, supra note 12. Article 2 of the Paris Agreement states the following:
(1) This Agreement, in enhancing the implementation of the Convention, including
its objective, aims to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change,
in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty,
including by: (a) Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well
below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature
increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would
significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change. Id. art. 2.

31.
Paris Agreement, supra note 12, art. 9 (“Developed country Parties shall provide financial
resources to assist developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation in
continuation of their existing obligations under the Convention. Other Parties are encouraged to provide
or continue to provide such support voluntarily.”). Id.; About GCF, GREEN CLIMATE FUND,
https://www.greenclimate.fund/about (last visited Jan. 28, 2021).
32.
Paris Agreement, supra note 12, art. 4, ¶ 2. (“Each Party shall prepare, communicate and
maintain successive nationally determined contributions that it intends to achieve. Parties shall pursue
domestic mitigation measures, with the aim of achieving the objectives of such contributions.”). Id.
33.
According to articles 4 and 9 of the Paris Agreement. See Paris Agreement, supra note 12,
arts. 4, ¶ 2, 9, ¶ 1.
34.
According to international law, all written international agreements governed by
international law are referred to as “treaties.” Vienna Convention, supra note 12, art. 2., ¶ 1(a); see also
BARRY E. CARTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 932 (7th ed. 2018).
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of scientific facts or objective truth; instead, such disagreements are more
likely to be motivated by conflicting “priorities, interests, and normative
assumptions that create a number of subjective truths.” 35 This increases
transaction costs for parties to reach an international energy law agreement.36
Moreover, energy security planning is such a “complex and dynamic
[process] that it is [very] difficult to unify perspectives,” even in a single
country.37 Examples abound38—for instance, the so-called flip-flop of the
United States’ position on the Paris Agreement is a major illustration of
domestic tensions and politics being determinative of global outcomes.39
Accordingly, any international agreement on climate change has to
reconcile inherent tensions between domestic and international politics. 40
Those treaties also have to consider the different levels of countries’ growth
and industrialization on a global scale. 41 This part turns to two specific
international principles contained in the Paris Agreement that may contribute
to global action to combat the pandemic as well as to foster a greener
economy.42 These principles are sustainable development and common but
differentiated responsibilities. 43 This part concludes by examining the

35.
Benjamin K. Sovacool & Marilyn Brown, Deconstructing Facts and Frames in Energy
Research: Maxims for Evaluating Contentious Problems, 86 ENERGY POL’Y 36, 36−37 (2015).
36.
Id. at 38.
37.
See Benjamin K. Sovacool & Harry Saunders, Competing Policy Packages and the
Complexity of Energy Security, 67 ENERGY 641, 641 (2014), emphasizing that,
The result is that important interdependencies and interconnections are sometimes
missed, laying a faulty foundation that can give rise to more intractable energy
problems down the road. The policymaker in India who seeks to improve access to
electricity to mitigate the health damage caused by indoor combustion of firewood
for cooking becomes an advocate of coal-fired power plants. A local problem is
solved and a national dilemma is born.
38.
Sovacool & Brown, supra note 35, at 38; Mark Cooper, Governing the global climate
commons: The political economy of state and local action, after the U.S. flip-flop on the Paris Agreement,
118 ENERGY POL’Y 440, 440 (2018).
39.

Cooper, supra note 38, at 440.

40.

See generally Sovacool & Saunders, supra note 37, at 641.

41.

Id.

42.
Paris Agreement, supra note 12, at 1; Climate & SDGS Synergy Conference, U.N. DEP’T OF
ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, https://sdgs.un.org/events/climate-and-sdgs-synergy-conference-7569 (last
visited Jan. 15, 2021); Climate Action, U.N., https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/climate-action/
(last visited Jan. 15, 2021).
43.

Paris Agreement, supra note 12, at 1.
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specific impact of the pandemic on international negotiations at the future
Conference of the Parties (COP).44
A.

Sustainable Development

Sustainable development, with preliminary notions that date back to
1945, was conceptualized with more precision at the United Nations
Conference on the Human Environment, in 1972.45 However, this concept
was not used until the 1980s, when the Brundtland Commission Report
defined it as “development . . . that . . . meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”46
Later on, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development framed it in
a quite anthropocentric fashion, stating in Principle 1 that “[h]uman beings
are at the centre of concerns for sustainable development. They are entitled
to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature.” 47 World
governments adopted sustainable development as the development paradigm
in 1992, at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
(UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.48
As the concept of sustainable development has been significantly
debated—with many questioning its legal force and whether it has some other
normative value, even one of a non-legal or quasi-legal character 49 —the
dimensions considered in the Paris Agreement are open to debate.50 There
44.
The Ambition, CLIMATE AMBITION SUMMIT 2020, https://www.climateambition
summit2020.org/index.php#programme (last visited Jan. 15, 2021) [hereinafter The Ambition]; Climate
Ambition Summit 2020, IISD (Dec. 12, 2020), https://sdg.iisd.org/events/5th-anniversary-of-the-parisagreement/#:~:text=The%20Climate%20Ambition%20Summit%202020,Agreement%20and%20the%2
0multilateral%20process.
45.
U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/Rev.1, at 3 (June 5,
1972); Promote Sustainable Development, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/en/sections/what-wedo/promote-sustainable-development/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2020); see also Bimal N. Patel & Ranita Nagar,
Introduction, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND INDIA: CONVERGENCE OF LAW, ECONOMICS,
SCIENCE, AND POLITICS 1−10 (Bimal N. Patel & Ranita Nagar eds., 2018).
46.
U.N. Secretary-General, Our Common Future: Report of the World Commission on
Environment and Development, From One Earth to Another, pt. 1, § 3, ¶ 27, § 4, ¶ 81, U.N. Doc A/42/427
(Aug. 4, 1987); see also EDITH BROWN WEISS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 26,
184 (2016); Patel & Nagar, supra note 45, at 1.
47.
Stephen Hammer & Stéphane Hallegatte, Planning for the economic recovery from COVID19: A sustainability checklist for policymakers, WORLD BANK BLOGS (Apr. 14, 2020),
https://blogs.worldbank.org/climatechange/planning-economic-recovery-covid-19-coronavirussustainability-checklist-policymakers.
48.
Id.
49.
Riccardo Pavoni & Dario Piselli, The Sustainable Development Goals and International
Environmental Law: Normative Value and Challenges for Implementation, 13 VEREDAS DO DIREITO,
BELO HORIZANTE 13, 15 (2016).
50.
Id.; see generally Paris Agreement, supra note 12.
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is, however, some consensus in interpreting sustainable development in that
it requires analysis of the interplay between economic growth, social
development, and environmental protection. 51 In the aftermath of the
pandemic, the emphasis on social development—including access to medical
care, clean energy, education, and a healthy environment—will become
crucial.52
B.

Common but Differentiated Responsibilities

The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and
respective capabilities (CBDRRC), referring specifically to different
responsibilities allocated among countries,53 has been controversial since its
inception in the UNFCCC.54 The principle appears, more recently, in the
Paris Agreement. 55 According to this principle, responsibility for both
current and historical emissions need to be considered.56 The evidence is
unambiguous: from 1850 to 2011, the developed world contributed 79% of
GHG emissions.57
As developing states have had a far lower impact on the current
concentration of GHGs and the overall threshold on carbon saturation, 58
developed countries must provide climate financing to less developed
51.
Social
Development
for
Sustainable
Development,
UNITED
NATIONS,
https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/2030agenda-sdgs.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2021).
52.
Hammer & Hallegatte, supra note 47.
53.
United Nations Framework, supra note 26, art. 3, ¶ 1. (“The Parties should protect the
climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and
in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.”). Id.
54.
David Freestone, The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change—The
Basis for the Climate Change Regime, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE
CHANGE LAW 99, 103 (Cinnamon P. Carlarne et al. eds., 2016) (explaining the differentiated treatment
established under articles 4 and 12 of the UNFCCC, as Annex I parties encompass “all the developed
states and states with economies in transition . . . [namely] . . . the members of the former Soviet Union[,]”
while Annex II includes all the developed states which are expected to financially contribute. Developing
countries are defined as non-Annex I in the Convention). Id.; see also United Nations Framework, supra
note 26.
55.
Paris Agreement, supra note 12, art. 2, ¶ 2. (“This Agreement will be implemented to reflect
equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the
light of different national circumstances.”). Id. arts. 2, 9.
56.
Daniel Bodansky et al., International Environmental Law: Mapping the Field, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1, 11 (2008).
57.
Jonah Busch, Climate Change and Development in Three Charts, CTR. FOR GLOB. DEV.
(Aug. 18, 2015), https://www.cgdev.org/blog/climate-change-and-development-three-charts.
58.
Ting Wei et al., Developed and Developing World Contributions to Climate System Change
Based on Carbon Dioxide, Methane and Nitrous Oxide Emissions, 33 ADVANCES IN ATMOSPHERIC SCI.
632, 632 (2016); Bodansky et al., supra note 56, at 11 (noting article 3 of the UNFCCC refers to
“respective capabilities,” which means that capacity to pay is relevant along historical responsibility). Id.
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countries, as determined by international treaties. 59 Importantly, energy
justice also fosters institutional action, which may minimize the impact of
the so-called “curse” of natural resources for developing countries. 60
Institutional action, under the terms of the UNFCCC and the Paris
Agreement, requires developed countries to take the lead in reducing
emissions.61 The necessity of this leadership has been proven even more
relevant in light of the pandemic and the economic crisis that has ensued.62
Likewise, the need to transfer funding and technology increased during the
pandemic. 63 This exacerbates the international obligation of developed
countries to not only invest in their own greener recovery, but also to steer
efforts for such greener scenarios in developing nations.64 This is why the
legal framework of the Paris Agreement calls for financial contributions to
the Green Climate Fund, which was established by the Conference of the
Parties in 2010 (under the UNFCCC, and as part of the Convention’s
financial mechanism).65 More specifically, the Green Climate Fund aims to
advance adaptation to the impact of climate change and reduce GHG
emissions in the developing world.66 Importantly, recent research contends
that overreliance on technological innovation has jeopardized a significant
reduction of GHG emissions at the expense of countries located in the Global
South, as well as those more vulnerable populations in the future, globally.67
Accordingly, more actions from developed countries are needed quickly.
59.
Paris Agreement, supra note 12, art. 9; see also United Nations Framework, supra note 26,
art. 3, ¶ 1.
60.
Paris Agreement, supra note 12, art. 11; Stewart M. Patrick, Why Natural Resources Are a
Curse on Developing Countries and How to Fix It, ATLANTIC (Apr. 30, 2012)
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/04/why-natural-resources-are-a-curse-ondeveloping-countries-and-how-to-fix-it/256508/.
61.
See, e.g., United Nations Framework, supra note 26, arts. 3–4; Paris Agreement, supra note
12, art. 4.
62.
U.N. GAOR, 31st Spec. Sess., 2nd Plen Mtg. U.N. Doc GA/12293 (Dec. 3, 2020).
63.
Id.
64.
Id.
65.
The Green Climate Fund technically aims to finance equal amounts to mitigation as well as
to adaptation initiatives under the UNFCCC. Its first mobilization dates back to 2014, and since the Paris
Agreement (2015), the Fund has played an important role in advancing the objectives established in the
Paris
Agreement
on
Climate
Change.
Overview,
GREEN
CLIMATE
FUND,
https://www.greenclimate.fund/about (last visited Jan. 20, 2021); Paris Agreement, supra note 12, art. 9.
66.
The Green Climate Fund focuses on the needs of those who are “highly vulnerable to the
effects of climate change,” specifically in Least Developed Countries (LDCs), Small Island Developing
States (SIDs), and African States. Overview, supra note 65.
67.
Lancaster University, Why relying on new technology won’t save the planet, SCI. DAILY
(APR. 20, 2020), https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2020/04/200420125510.htm.
Each novel promise not only competes with existing ideas, but also downplays any
sense of urgency, enabling the repeated deferral of political deadlines for climate
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The Climate Ambition Summit: 2020

The United Nations, France, and the United Kingdom, in partnership
with Chile and Italy, jointly hosted the Climate Ambition Summit on
December 12, 2020.68 This virtual meeting gathered representatives of most
Member States, indigenous peoples, civil society, non-governmental
organizations, and other key actors in preparation for the next Conference of
the Parties—COP 26, which was postponed to November 2021, due to the
pandemic.69 The goal was to discuss the implementation of “new and [more]
ambitious commitments under the three pillars of the Paris Agreement:
mitigation, adaptation and finance commitments.”70
On the eve of the Climate Ambition Summit, the European Union
reiterated its earlier commitment to reduce its GHG emissions by at least
55%, having the net carbon emissions measured in 1990 as its baseline.71
The increasing number of countries committing to net-zero emissions goals
by 2050 is “the most significant and encouraging development in terms of
climate policy in 2020.”72 Top polluters, such as the European Union, Japan,
and China (committing to achieve net-neutrality by 2050 and 2060,
respectively) have already explicitly embraced such goals, whereas in the
United States, the Biden-Harris administration has already signaled its
intention to follow suit.73 Therefore, the pandemic has contributed to overall
cooperation among different countries and an overall willingness for
developed world nations to engage in more ambitious climate goals.74 For
developing nations, it is too early to make a judgment call.

action and undermining societal commitment to meaningful responses . . . but such
promises can feed systemic 'moral corruption', in which current elites are enabled
to pursue self-serving pathways, while passing off risk onto vulnerable people in
the future and in the global South. Id.
68.
The Ambition, supra note 44.
69.
Id.; Press Release, United Nations Climate Change, COP-26 Postponed, UN Climate Press
Release (Apr. 1, 2020); Press Release, U.K. Gov., New Dates Agreed for COP26 United Nations Climate
Change Conference (May 28, 2020).
70.
The Ambition, supra note 44.
71.
Monika Pronczuk, E.U. Agrees to Slash Carbon Emissions by 2030, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/11/world/europe/eu-climate-emissions.html (discussing the
new pledges of the European Union, who increased its original commitment in reducing net carbon
emissions in at least 55% from its levels measured in 1990). The article also informs that this stringent
target positions the European Union in the forefront of global climate fighting and strategically sets the
bloc on its path to carbon neutrality by 2050. Id.; Live: Climate Ambition Summit, U.N. NEWS (Dec. 12,
2020), https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/12/1079862.
72.
Emissions Gap Report 2020, supra note 20, at 7.
73.
Id. at 7.
74.
Id. at 4–5.
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III. THE MAIN CHALLENGES REGARDING INTERNATIONAL ENERGY LAW
AND THE FULFILLMENT OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT’S GOALS
This part focuses on the main challenges that policy makers will face in
the field of international energy law as they aim to fulfill the goals of the
Paris Agreement, namely, to limit the global increase in mean temperature to
well below 2°C (35.6°F) compared to pre-industrial levels.75
First, the pandemic is likely to increase emissions of GHGs, unless
countries actively engage in investing in a greener economy.76 The decline
in green energy investments provoked by the pandemic may also contribute
to a spike in carbon emissions. 77 The flexibilization of the enforcement
concerning environmental regulations may also contribute to increased
emissions.78 Pandemic-related cleaning and disinfecting activities are also
expected to have a negative environmental impact.79
Second, the Biden-Harris administration is committed to fostering
energy transition from fossil fuels to a greener economy but faces significant
challenges with current policies. 80
Specifically, the Biden-Harris
administration will have to undo numerous anti-climate policies
implemented by the Trump administration.81 Key among them is the United
States’ withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, which occurred on November
4, 2020.82 The Paris Agreement is considered a historic breakthrough, as it

75.
Paris Agreement, supra note 12, art. 2.
76.
Emissions Gap Report 2020, supra note 20, at 6 (discussing the need for more stringent
NDCs as well as specific policies to reduce GHGs emissions such as investments on research and the
support for zero emissions). Id.
77.
Kenneth T. Gillingham et al., The Short-run and Long-run effects of COVID-19 on Energy
and the Environment, 4 JOULE 1337, 1338–1341 (2020).
78.
Emissions Gap Report 2020, supra note 20, at 13; U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Memorandum
on COVID-19 Implications for EPA's Enforcement and Compliance Assurance Program (Mar. 26, 2020),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2020-03/documents/oecamemooncovid19implications.pdf.
79.
Mandred Lenzen et al., Global Socio-Economic Losses and Environmental Gains from the
Coronavirus
Pandemic,
15
PLOS
ONE
(July
9,
2020),
https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0235654.
80.
The Biden Plan for a Clean Energy Revolution and Environmental Justice, BIDENHARRIS,
https://joebiden.com/climate-plan/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2021); Tyler Clevenger & Dan Lashof, 7 Ways
the Biden Administration Can Reverse Climate Rollbacks, WORLD RES. INST. (Jan. 19, 2021),
https://www.wri.org/blog/2021/01/7-ways-biden-administration-can-reverse-climate-rollbacks.
81.
Clevenger & Lashof, supra note 80.
82.
Art. 28 of the Paris Agreement, which determines the withdrawal procedure, does not
authorize notice of withdrawal within the first three years that the Agreement has entered into force. Paris
Agreement, supra note 12, art. 28. The United States served notice of the withdrawal on the first date
possible under the Paris Agreement. Lisa Friedman, Trump Serves Notice to Quit Paris Climate
Agreement,
N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/04/climate/trump-paris-agreementclimate.html (last updated Jan. 20, 2021).
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marked the end of a decade long stalemate over the full integration of the
United States and developing economies into the climate regime.83
In such a context, the Biden-Harris administration deserves praise for
advocating that the United States rejoin the Paris Agreement on its first day
in office.84 The Biden-Harris administration will have to address the ongoing
economic, environmental, and health crises that were aggravated by the
COVID-19 pandemic and the policy choices made by the Trump
administration. 85 The attacks by President Trump on science, which are
routinely referred to as a “war on science,” have undermined significant
environmental protections and ultimately jeopardized the health and quality
of life of the United States population. 86 Importantly, those with less
financial resources have suffered the most.87
Third, there is significant uncertainty concerning the level of United
States engagement and leadership on urgent climate matters. 88 Despite
reiterated commitments of the Biden-Harris administration, including the
previously referenced rejoining of the United States to the Paris Agreement
and the appointment of John Kerry as a special envoy for climate,89 how
effectively the new administration implements its climate goals remains to
be seen. 90 Moreover, the world’s response to the United States as it is
83.
Meinhard Doelle, Assessment of Strengths and Weaknesses, in THE PARIS AGREEMENT ON
CLIMATE CHANGE: ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY 387, 400 (Daniel Klein et al. eds., 2017).
84.
The President-elect tweeted that his administration will rejoin the Paris Agreement. See Joe
Biden vows to rejoin the Paris climate deal on first day of office if elected, CARBON BRIEF (Nov. 11,
2020), https://www.carbonbrief.org/daily-brief/joe-biden-vows-to-rejoin-the-paris-climate-deal-on-firstday-of-office-if-elected [hereinafter Rejoin Paris climate deal].
85.
Impact of COVID-19 on people’s livelihoods, their health and our food systems, WHO (Oct.
13, 2020), https://www.who.int/news/item/13-10-2020-impact-of-covid-19-on-people's-livelihoodstheir-health-and-our-food-systems; Clevenger & Lashof, supra note 80.
86.
Carolina Arlota, How President Trump’s War on Science Undermines Cost-Benefit Analysis
of Climate Policies, 50 ENV’T L. REP. 10999, 11007−14 (2020).
87.
Id.; Carmin Chappel, Climate change in the US will hurt poor people the most, according
to a bombshell federal report, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/11/26/climate-change-will-hurt-poorpeople-the-most-federal-report.html (last updated Nov. 26, 2018).
88.
Carolyn Beeler, Top US leadership is ‘missing ingredient’ in climate change action, WORLD
(Sept. 18, 2019), https://www.pri.org/stories/2019-09-18/top-us-leadership-missing-ingredient-climatechange-action.
89.
Rejoin Paris climate deal, supra note 84; Lisa Friedman, With John Kerry Pick, Biden
selects a ‘Climate Envoy’ With Stature, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/23/climate/johnkerry-climate-change.html (last updated Dec. 11, 2020) (emphasizing that the special climate envoy is a
new cabinet-level position to be created under President-elect Biden’s presidency).
90.
See generally Thomas Hale and Nathan Hultman, ‘All in’ Climate Diplomacy: How a
Biden-Harris Administration can Leverage City, State, Business, and Community Climate Action,
BROOKINGS (Nov. 20, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/all-in-climate-diplomacy-how-abiden-harris-administration-can-leverage-city-state-business-and-community-climate-action/ (discussing
the administration’s various implementation strategies and what will be needed in order to successfully
implement those strategies).
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reclaiming its leadership on climate policies is unclear.91 After all, United
States leadership in international matters has been jeopardized under
President Trump due to his unpredictability and his agenda to undo all
significant agreements made by his predecessor, President Obama.92 In the
field of international energy law alone (and in addition to the country’s
withdrawal from the Paris Agreement), the United States denunciation of the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (or the “Iran deal”),93 the Trans-Pacific
Partnership,94 and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty95 all serve
as evidence of how the Trump administration decided in a rush and with little
consideration for the international community as a whole.
Fourth, many countries have relinquished the opportunity brought by
the pandemic to build a more environmentally conscious economy.96 An
91.
Lara Lázaro-Touza, Biden-Harris Administration and Climate Change: Good News,
Caveats and Warnings, ELCANO ROYAL INST. (last updated Jan. 22, 2021),
http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/el
cano/elcano_in/zonas_in/ari9-2021-lazaro-biden-harris-administration-and-climate+change-good+newscaveats-and-warnings.
92.
Press Release, Emmanuel Macron, Angela Merkel, and Paolo Gentiloni, Paris Agreement
Cannot be Renegotiated (June 1, 2017) (on file with Ministère de L’Europe et des Affaires Étrangères).
In a joint statement, French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and then
Italian Prime Minister Paolo Gentiloni were vocal in stating that President Trump’s decision was against
ongoing progress and that the Agreement was solid and not open to renegotiation. Such leaders jointly
declared: “We deem the momentum generated in Paris in December 2015 irreversible and we firmly
believe that the Paris Agreement cannot be renegotiated, since it is a vital instrument for our planet,
societies and economies.” Id.; see Juliet Eilperin & Darla Cameron, How Trump is Rolling Back Obama’s
Legacy,
WASH.
POST
(last
updated
Jan.
20,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/trump-rolling-back-obama-rules/; see also Carolina
Arlota, Does the United States’ Withdrawal From the Paris Agreement Pass the Cost-Benefit Analysis
Test?, 41 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 881, 881 (2020) (criticizing the United States’ climate policies under the
Trump administration and its reduced leadership after its decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement
while continuing in the UNFCCC).
93.
See Remarks on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to Prevent Iran From Obtaining a
Nuclear Weapon and an Exchange with Reporters, 2018 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2, (May 8, 2018).
94.
Memorandum of Withdrawal of the U.S. from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations
and Agreement, 2017 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (Jan. 23, 2017).
95.
The Trump administration withdrew from this agreement with Russia, despite its previous
praise for the treaty, which was signed by President Reagan. See C. Todd Lopez, U.S. Withdraws From
Intermediate–Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, U.S. DEPT. DEF. (Aug. 2, 2019),
https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/1924779/us-withdraws-from-intermediaterange-nuclear-forces-treaty/. For a limited justification of the withdrawal, see Remarks in an Exchange
with Reporters in Elko, Nevada, 2018 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 3–4 (Oct. 20, 2018); see also Daryl
Kimball & Kingston Reif, The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty at a Glance, ARMS CONTROL
ASS’N., https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/INFtreaty (last reviewed Aug. 2019).
96.
See OECD, GREEN BUDGETING AND TAX POLICY TOOLS TO SUPPORT A GREEN RECOVERY
1, 2–3 (2020), http://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/green-budgeting-and-tax-policy-toolsto-support-a-green-recovery-bd02ea23/ (discussing what countries plan to do but have yet to do, in order
to build a more environmentally conscious economy).
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example of such an economy would be one based on the social cost of
carbon. 97
Recent research by Princeton University advised the
implementation of carbon pricing (whether as taxes or emissions trading)
aimed at reducing the adverse impacts of climate change as economies “build
back better.” 98 According to this research, the pandemic could be an
opportunity to improve sustainability and maximize well-being around the
globe as countries recover.99 Therefore, international energy law policies
aiming to implement the goals established by the Paris Agreement should be
based on mitigation, as the World Bank has defined mitigation action as “the
best insurance against an uncertain future.”100 Mitigation, therefore, is the
only way to effectively reduce carbon emissions.101
In such a context, leading emitters of GHGs, such as China, the United
States, Japan, and India face difficult policy choices, as their emissions are
based on large scale utilization of fossil fuels to produce energy for industry
and transportation sectors. 102 These countries’ emissions are considered
more difficult to abate, as significant investments and technological
innovation are required to achieve meaningful reductions. 103 Mitigation
technologies, such as carbon capture and storage (CCS), are a feasible
alternative for the reduction in the emission of CO2, particularly in the energy
sector. 104 Nonetheless, cost remains a significant challenge for CCS
implementation.105
97.
98.

See id. at 10–12.
Kian Mintz-Woo et al., Carbon Pricing and COVID-19, CLIMATE POL’Y. 1, 2 (Nov. 15,

2020),
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14693062.2020.1831432?scroll=top&needAccess=true.
99.
Id. at 7.
100. WORLD BANK, TURN DOWN THE HEAT: WHY A 4°C WARMER WORLD MUST BE AVOIDED
1,
2
(2012),
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/865571468149107611/pdf/NonAsciiFileName0.pdf.
101. See id. at 25.
102. Each Country’s Share of CO2 Emissions, UNION CONCERNED SCIENTISTS,
https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/each-countrys-share-co2-emissions (last updated Aug. 12, 2020);
Melissa Denchak, Fossil Fuels: The Dirty Facts, NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL (Jun. 8, 2018),
https://www.nrdc.org/stories/fossil-fuels-dirty-facts. The concept of “hard to abate emissions” is defined
by the Energy Transition Commission (ETC). See Mission Possible: Reaching Net-Zero Carbon
Emissions from Harder-to-Abate Sectors by Mid-Century, ENERGY TRANSITIONS COMM’N (Nov. 2018),
http://www.energy-transitions.org/sites/default/files/ETC_MissionPossible_FullReport.pdf [hereinafter
Reaching Net-Zero Carbon Emissions]. Such “harder-to-abate” emissions comprise those of sectors in
heavy industry (in particular cement, steel and chemicals) and heavy-duty transport (heavy-duty road
transport, shipping and aviation). Id. at 11. These sectors currently account for 10Gt (30%) of total global
CO2 emissions. Id. at 11.
103. Reaching Net-Zero Carbon Emissions, supra note 102, at 75.
104. The Global Status of CCS: 2017, GLOBAL CCS INST. 43 (2017),
https://www.globalccsinstitute.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/2017-Global-Status-Report.pdf.
105. See id. at 19.
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Accordingly, investments in mitigation efforts need to include a diverse
portfolio of financing sources, including a combination of public funds,
carbon market finance, and concessional financing.106 Moreover, financing
a greener economy is likely to be a challenge on its own, due to the resources
spent during the pandemic as well as the need for economic relief to those
who lost their jobs.107 A recent study by the Guardian revealed that countries
are pouring money into the fossil fuel economy to reduce the economic
impact of the pandemic, including its severe recession. 108 Therefore, the
pandemic increased the competition for funding.109
Such competition is also likely to have an adverse impact on
renewables. 110 On the one hand, as countries commit to more stringent
targets under the Paris Agreement, renewable resources are expected to rise
again.111 This is relevant as renewables require investment on research and
dissemination as well as implementation. 112 On the other hand, major
obstacles regarding renewable energy sources remain, such as affordability
and the need for grid updates.113
Fluctuation of energy supply prices also increased the competition for
credit. 114 Oil hit record low prices in March 2020, stranding financial

106. Sujata Gupta et. al., Cross-cutting Investment and Finance Issues, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014:
MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE. CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP III TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT
REPORT OF THE INTER-GOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 1207, 1227 (2014),
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/ipcc_wg3_ar5_chapter16.pdf.
107. See Fiona Harvey, Revealed: Covid recovery plans threaten global climate hopes,
GUARDIAN (Nov. 9, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/nov/09/revealed-covidrecovery-plans-threaten-global-climate-hopes.
108. Id.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. Kieran Mulvaney, Climate change report card: These countries are reaching targets,
NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC,
https://www.nationalgeographic.co.uk/environment-andconservation/2019/09/climate-change-report-card-these-countries-are-reaching (last updated Nov. 5,
2020); Global Energy Review 2020, The Impacts of the COVID-19 Crisis on Global Energy Demand and
CO2 Emissions, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY (Apr. 2020), https://www.iea.org/reports/global-energy-review2020/renewables.
112. Kesavan Sprinivasan & Srinivas Guarazada, Investing in a more suitable world during
COVID-19
recovery,
WORLD
BANK
BLOGS
(June
24,
2020),
https://blogs.worldbank.org/governance/investing-more-sustainable-world-during-covid-19-recovery;
U.S. DEP’T ENERGY, RENEWABLE ENERGY INTEGRATION (2021).
113. Easy to Say, Difficult to Achieve: Experts Discuss Forging a Fair, Green Economy, IISD
(Aug. 22, 2019), https://sdg.iisd.org/news/easy-to-say-difficult-to-achieve-experts-discuss-forging-a-fairgreen-economy/; Aaron Larson, Electric Transmission Grid Problems and Solutions, POWER (Aug. 3,
2020), https://www.powermag.com/electric-transmission-grid-problems-and-solutions/.
114. See ICIS Editorial, Coronavirus Impact on Energy Markets, INDEP. COMMODITY
INTELLIGENCE SERV., https://www.icis.com/explore/resources/news/2020/03/19/10482507/topic-pagecoronavirus-impact-on-energy-markets (last updated Nov. 13, 2020).
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resources. 115 With such diversified demand, funding to investments is
changing116 while the need for significant greener investments is increasing
under international treaties, as previously discussed.117 Furthermore, there
are increasing concerns regarding environmental protection and climate
change, both internationally118 and in the United States.119 This may lead to
progress. However, as of today, all of the challenges discussed are
relevant. 120 The manner in which countries decide to address these
challenges will be determinative of the future of the Paris Agreement and the
fulfillment of its goals. 121 The task is tremendously difficult, and the
pandemic may have aggravated it.122 There are no definitive answers for
now, as matters are still in flux.

115.

An Unprecedented Global Health and Economic Crisis, supra note 6; KEVIN L. CAMP ET

AL., U.S. BUREAU STAT., FROM THE BARREL TO THE PUMP : THE IMPACT OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC ON
PRICES FOR PETROLEUM PRODUCTS (2020), https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2020/article/from-the-barrelto-the-pump.htm.
116. This issue is of increased importance, as the European Investment Bank announced that it
will stop funding fossil fuels projects after 2021. Emanuela Barbiroglio, European Investment Bank will
Stop
Financing
New
Fossil
Fuels
Projects,
FORBES
(Nov.
15,
2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/emanuelabarbiroglio/2019/11/15/european-investment-bank-will-stopfinancing-new-fossil-fuels-projects/#42cedd5b9253.
117. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 25; Montreal Protocol, supra note 25.
118. See also Stephen Castle, U.K. to Halt Subsidies for Fossil Fuel Projects Abroad, N.Y.
TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/11/world/europe/UK-fossil-fuel-subsidies.html (last updated
Dec. 14, 2020) (highlighting that the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the
International Energy Agency have urged countries to reduce or cut government subsidies for fossil fuels).
119. Jeanna Smialek, Fed Joins Climate Network, to Applause from the Left, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
15,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/15/business/economy/fed-climatenetwork.html?action=click& module=Latest&pgtype=Homepage (noting that the Federal Reserve board
in Washington “voted unanimously to become a member of the Network of Central Banks and Supervisors
for Greening the Financial System” and that the Fed began participating in the group more than a year
ago, but “Republicans have eyed warily” the Fed’s formal membership while Democrats have been
fighting for it).
120. Stephen Leahy, Most countries aren't hitting 2030 climate goals, and everyone will pay the
price,
NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC
(Nov.
5,
2019),
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/2019/11/nations-miss-paris-targets-climate-drivenweather-events-cost-billions/.
121. Id.
122. Amy Lieberman, Despite pandemic slowdown, climate change continues to worsen, DEVEX
(Sept. 10, 2020), https://www.devex.com/news/despite-pandemic-slowdown-climate-change-continuesto-worsen-98053.
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IV. CONCLUSION
As we move forward, the disruption to our long standing way of life will
fade away.123 The main challenge moving forward is to learn the lesson on
the importance of cooperation among countries, among scientists, and civil
society sectors. 124 The pandemic was a significant reminder that
international order exists to advance the protection of the human dignity.125
In addition, the role and necessity of governmental regulation was clearly
evidenced by the pandemic, because of different factors such as the necessity
of a national mandate on masks, the issuance of ban on international travels,
and coordination of resources to secure research and effective vaccination.126
[W]hen we get past this crisis—which we will—we will face a
choice. We can go back to the world as it was before or deal
decisively with those issues that make us all unnecessarily
vulnerable to crises . . . The recovery from the COVID-19 crisis
must lead to a different economy. Everything we do during and
after this crisis must be with a strong focus on building more equal,
inclusive and sustainable economies and societies that are more
resilient in the face of pandemics, climate change and the many
other global challenges we face.127

In the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic and its related economic
crisis, it remains to be seen if foreign leaders will use the disruption caused
by such crises to steer a greener economy.128 Let’s hope countries do their
homework and engage in specific policies effectively considering the social
123. See, e.g., Press Release, UN Secretary-General, ‘We are Only as Strong as the Weakest,’
Secretary-General Stresses, at Launch of Economic Report on COVID-19 Pandemic, U.N. Press Release
SG/SM/20029 (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.un.org/press/en/2020/sgsm20029.doc.htm [hereinafter
Economic Report on COVID-19].
124. Id.
125. Human Rights Dimensions of COVID-19 Response, Human Rts. Watch (Mar. 19, 2020),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/19/human-rights-dimensions-covid-19-response; Patricia Park,
International Law for Energy and the Environment 26 (2013) (discussing the main goal of international
law, in general).
126. REGULATORY QUALITY AND COVID-19: THE USE OF REGULATORY MANAGEMENT TOOLS
IN A TIME OF CRISIS (2020), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/view/?ref=136_136858-iv4xb9i639&title=
Regulatory-quality-and-COVID-19-The-use-of-regulatory-management-tools-in-a-time-of-crisis;
RESPONSES TO COVID-19 IN THE UNITED STATES, https://www.loc.gov/law/help/covid-19responses/us.php (last updated Dec. 30, 2020).
127. Economic Report on COVID-19, supra note 123.
128. Megan Rowling, World leaders urged to learn from pandemic in adapting to climate
change, REUTERS, https://www.reuters.com/article/climate-change-coronavirus-politics/world-leadersurged-to-learn-from-pandemic-in-adapting-to-climate-change-idUSL8N2JX4Y6 (last updated Jan. 22,
2021).
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cost of carbon and the divestment from fossil fuels, while being more
attentive to climate justice.129 The Paris Agreement has instruments to steer
such policies.130 The open-ended question is if countries are fully committed
to such Agreement. Therefore, the next five years are of particular interest
for the Paris Agreement on Climate Change and more broadly, International
Energy Law.131

129. Janice Ng, The Social Cost of CalPERS’ Carbon Investments: $41.73 Billion in 2018,
FOSSIL FREE CAL. (July 16, 2020), https://fossilfreeca.org/2020/07/16/calpers-portfolio-contributes-tosocietys-costs-from-carbon-emissions/.
130. See generally Paris Agreement, supra note 12.
131. Paris Climate Agreement Q&A, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS,
https://www.c2es.org/content/paris-climate-agreement-qa/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2021).
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On its face, predicting the Biden administration’s international energy
policy would appear simple: look up the policy of the Obama administration.
Repeat. Done. There is, of course, more than a little truth to such an
understanding of the Biden administration. President Biden is himself an
alumnus of the Obama administration with significant input on the foreign
policy and energy policy decisions from the Obama administration. Many of
the people who will be tasked with implementing the Biden administration’s
international energy policy will themselves also be alumni and alumnae of the
Obama administration. Surely, then there will be more than a little overlap
between where the Obama administration left off and the Biden administration
will begin.
But one should tread cautiously in assuming that a Biden administration
will simply pick up where the Obama administration left off. There are three
important factors to consider. The first is the simple passage of time. The
passage of time is a particularly dramatic factor for international energy policy
due to the climate change clock. Current estimates suggest that climate
tipping points will be reached by 2030.1 These estimates may well be overly
optimistic. Four years of relative domestic and international inaction therefore
leaves the Biden administration with a qualitatively different starting position

Law.

*
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1.

UNITED NATIONS, EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2019 46 (2019).
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than a Clinton administration would have encountered. As such, the Biden
administration cannot simply use the Obama playbook. The runway to
doomsday has now been shortened by approximately one-third.
The second factor is economic. The COVID-19 pandemic has left the
world in a state of severe economic distress. It has killed more than 2.3 million
people worldwide.2 It has shut down countries and continents. In the process,
it has severely tested existing supply lines and thrown global markets into
chaos. One might thus analogize that the world finds itself closer to 2008
economically than 2016. The important caveat being that massive
government resources—in the trillions of dollars—have already been
marshaled to hold at bay the worst consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic.3
These resources, therefore, look to be potentially unavailable to combat
climate change.
The third factor is personal. President Biden by all accounts is far more
of a moderate on global energy policy than many Obama administration
alumni and possibly President Obama himself. President Biden is in many
ways an institutionalist and traditionalist—dare one say a “small-c
conservative.” He would thus be less inclined towards radical and fast change
than the prior administration would have been.
Where does that leave the Biden administration? As this Essay will
explore, it requires the Biden administration to respond to a worsening energy
trilemma at the time of increased geopolitical tensions that add further
challenges to this trilemma. The Biden administration hopes to resolve this
trilemma with an integrated vision of “building back better.”4 This vision of
“building back better” hopes to respond to each of the prongs of the energy
trilemma, while keeping an eye on geopolitical, energy-related tensions.5
The Biden administration finds itself in a bind in resolving this energy
trilemma. As we shall see, the Biden administration’s approach to
international economic governance is small-c conservative. This small-c
conservativism is ultimately incompatible with taking the build back better
program to a global scale. Such a program can only be realized to the extent
the Biden administration invests greater political and diplomatic capital in free
trade agreements and building a deeper international economic order to
support energy transition.
2.
Covid-19 Coronavirus Pandemic, WORLDOMETERS, https://www.worldometers.info/
coronavirus/ (last updated Feb. 27, 2021).
3.

INT’L MONETARY FUND, A YEAR LIKE NO OTHER: IMF ANNUAL REPORT 2020 5 (2020).

4.
The Biden Plan to Build a Modern Sustainable Infrastructure and An Equitable Clean Energy
Future, BIDENHARRIS, https://joebiden.com/clean-energy/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2021) [hereinafter Biden
Build].
5.
The Biden Plan to Secure Environmental Justice and Equitable Economic Activity,
BIDENHARRIS, https://joebiden.com/environmental-justice-plan/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2021) [hereinafter
Biden Plan].

351926-ILSA_International_27-2_Text.indd 72

3/26/21 12:36 PM

Sourgens

2021]
I.

295

ENERGY TRILEMMA

This section addresses the underlying challenge energy policy poses on
the international stage. It outlines that energy policy traditionally responds to
a trilemma of: environmental sustainability, energy equity/affordability, and
energy security. This trilemma transcends energy policy and in fact, is at the
heart of international energy law. The section outlines that current
circumstances exacerbate the urgency of each of the prongs of the dilemma.
The energy trilemma is reflected already in the core themes struck by
then President Biden’s transition.6 President Biden’s central message in his
victory speech was that “I believe it's this: Americans have called upon us to
marshal the forces of decency, the forces of fairness, to marshal the forces of
science and the forces of hope in the great battles of our time.” 7 Relevantly
for current purposes, President Biden highlighted the battle to build
prosperity.8 He also highlighted, “the battle to save our planet by getting
climate under control.”9 President Biden’s transition website similarly lists as
two of its four priorities “economic recovery” and “climate change.”10 This
speech at core thus hits on two of the three prongs of the energy trilemma—
environmental sustainability (climate change) and energy equity/affordability
(building prosperity).
The third prong of the energy trilemma is about energy security.11
Energy security is about the security of energy supply.12 This security of
supply is threatened in two separate, yet equally important ways. First, it is
threatened by external, geopolitical events.13 One example of such external,
geo-political events includes recent violent tensions between Iran, Saudi
Arabia, and the United States.14 These tensions led to a drone attack on one
6.

Id.

7.
Read the full text of Joe Biden's speech after historic election, ABC (Nov. 7, 2020),
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/read-full-text-joe-bidens-speech-historic-election/story?id=74084462.
8.

Id.

9.

Id.

10.
Priorities, BIDEN-HARRIS TRANSITION, https://buildbackbetter.gov/priorities/ (last visited
Jan 15, 2021).
11.
World Energy Trilemma Index, WORLD ENERGY COUNCIL, https://www.worldenergy.org/
transition-toolkit/world-energy-trilemma-index (last visited Jan. 15, 2021).
12.

Daniel Yergin, Ensuring Energy Security, 85 FOREIGN AFF. 69, 69–78 (2006).

Oil security: The global oil market remains vulnerable to a wide range of risk factors, INT’L
ENERGY AGENCY (Nov. 27, 2019), https://www.iea.org/areas-of-work/ensuring-energy-security/oilsecurity (last visited Jan. 19, 2021).
13.

14.
See Ellen R. Wald, 3 Reasons Iran Can’t Put a Toll on the Straits of Hormuz, FORBES (July
8, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenrwald/2019/07/08/3-reasons-iran-cant-put-a-toll-on-the-straitof-hormuz/?sh=45267cb75ff2 (discussing summer 2019 threats to navigation through the straits); Rockford
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of Saudi Arabia’s largest oil refining installations, sending shockwaves
through energy markets.15 Further, Iran has threatened one of the most
important shipping lanes for global oil supplies, the Straits of Hormuz.16
Three similarly important areas of tension include: 1) the South China Sea,
an area in which the People’s Republic of China is currently threatening
energy security through unlawful enforcement actions; 2) the Black Sea, an
area in which Russia threatens energy security by unlawfully annexed Crimea;
and 3) the Baltic Sea, an area of importance for European pipeline access that
is seeing increased Russian escalation.17
Second, energy security also can be impaired for reasons internal to
existing energy markets. These markets cannot rely upon technology that is
unable to deliver energy when it is needed. One such problem is the so-called
intermittent problem of renewable energy (how to deliver energy when the
sun does not shine and the wind does not blow).18 This problem has also arisen
in traditional energy markets, with the 2001 rolling California blackouts being
one example.19
These three prongs of the energy trilemma are reflected in a number of
international legal regimes. Environmental sustainability and climate change
are subject to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

Weitz, Explainer:
Could Iran Close the Strait of Hormuz, NAVY TIMES (Jan. 7, 2020),
https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2020/01/08/explainer-could-iran-close-the-strait-ofhormuz/; see also Iran Seizes British Tanker in Strait of Hormuz, BBC (July 20, 2019),
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-49053383; Ben Hubbard et al., Two Major Saudi Oil Installations Hit by
(Sept.
15,
2019),
Drone
Strike,
and
U.S.
Blames
Iran,
N.Y.
TIMES
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/14/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-refineries-drone- attack.html (last
updated Jan.15, 2020) (discussing the drone strike on Abqaiq and Khurais); see also Saudi Arabia Oil
Attacks:
UN 'Unable to Confirm Iranian Involvement’, BBC (Dec. 11, 2019),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-50742224 (discussing Iranian disputing responsibility for
the drone strike).
15.

Hubbard, supra note 14.

16.

See Wald, supra note 14; see also Weitz, supra note 14.

17.
See Tensions flare over South China Sea energy reserves, ARGUS (July 17, 2019),
https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/1941353-tensions-flare-over-south-china-sea-energy-reserves; see
also Ariel Cohen, As Russia Closes In On Crimea's Energy Resources, What Is Next For Ukraine?, FORBES
(Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2019/02/28/as-russia-closes-in-on-crimeasenergy-resources-what-is-next-for-ukraine/?sh=69b3408929cd; see also Andrew E. Kramer, Pipeline
Politics:
Why
Nord
Stream
2
Is
Back
in
the
Spotlight,
N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/14/world/europe/nord-stream-2-russia-germany.html (last updated
Sept. 16, 2020).
18.
Paul Rogers, California grid operator warned of power shortages as state transitioned to
clean energy, MERCURY NEWS, https://www.mercurynews.com/2020/08/17/california-blackouts-exposeproblems-in-states-transition-to-clean-energy/ (last updated Aug. 17, 2020).
19.

Id.
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and the Paris Agreement concluded under its auspices.20 Questions of energy
affordability and equity fall under human rights as well as international
economic law consisting broadly of trade and investment law.21 Energy
security in turn can be improved both by international economic law to address
internal energy problems, regimes governing international peace, and security
to address geopolitical threats.
Each of these different prongs of the trilemma, in addition, calls on
multiple other international legal regimes to the floor. Most centrally,
international climate concerns have also raised human rights issues.22 These
human rights issues have led domestic courts in the Netherlands to order
governments to increase their emission reduction targets.23 These issues have
also made headway in the Inter-American system to focus on the human rights
implications of climate change and thus increased pressure to increase climate
action.24
At the same time, such human rights concerns also affect energy equity.25
Energy is one of the backbones necessary for economic activity.26 It is
essential to deliver healthcare services and education, and thus central to
development.27 Moreover, it is central to a host of positive human rights to
the point that scholars have posited the existence of a right to electricity.28
As the Biden administration focuses on energy and climate policy, it,
therefore, acts not just in one area of international law. Rather, its policies
20.
See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, Sept. 5, 1992, S.
TREATY DOC NO. 102–38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107; see also Paris Agreement art. 2, Dec. 12, 2015, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev/ [hereinafter Paris Agreement].
21.
Apurvaa Pandey, Energy: A Basic Human Right, GEOPOLITICAL MONITOR (Apr. 24, 2018),
https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/energy-a-basic-human-right/.
22.
See Maria L. Banda, Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ Advisory Opinion on the
Environment and Human Rights, 22 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. INSIGHTS (May 10, 2018),
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/22/issue/6/inter-american-court-human-rights-advisory-opinionenvironment-and-human#_edn1; see also Groundbreaking Inquiry in Philippines Links Carbon Majors to
Human Rights Impacts of Climate Change, Calls for Greater Accountability, CTR. FOR INT’L ENVTL. L.
(Dec. 9, 2019), https://www.ciel.org/news/groundbreaking-inquiry-in-philippines-links-carbon-majors-tohuman-rights-impacts-of-climate-change-calls-for-greater-accountability/.
23.

HR 20 December 2019, ECLI:NL:HR:2019:2007.

24.
The Environment and Human Rights (State Obligations in Relation to the Environment in the
Context of the Protection and Guarantee of the Rights to Life and to Personal Integrity: Interpretation and
Scope of Articles 4(1) and 5(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC23/17, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. A) No. 23 (Nov. 15, 2017) 1, 32.
25.
(2020).

Lars Löfquist, Is There a Universal Right to Electricity?, 24 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 711, 718

26.

Id. at 711.

27.

Id. at 721.

28.

Id. at 712.
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will have to move across different areas of international law. 29 Energy and
climate cannot be reduced to a single regime. They are systemic concerns.
As this Essay will discuss, the Biden administration is approaching climate
and energy from a systemic perspective. Yet, its approach likely lacks the
toolkit fully to unlock the energy trilemma. The two main problems for the
Biden administration are the lack of a clear vision of how the energy trilemma
can be balanced and the thorny nature of any engagement with China—an
engagement for which the current Biden team seems not as well equipped as
it could have been.30 At the same time, the Biden administration’s approach
of “building back better” may well provide the building blocks out of which
such a fuller approach could be built.31 There thus remains a reason to be
cautiously optimistic that the Biden administration will fully embrace its
slogan as part of a broader overhaul of the global legal energy infrastructure.
II.

BUILDING BACK BETTER

The Biden administration recognizes the need to integrate energy
solutions into a response involving the entire government rather than just any
one department.32 This commitment is most clearly visible in two contexts.
The first is in the programmatic approach to building back better.33 The
second is in the staffing of key positions dealing with international and
domestic energy policy.34 Both of these help us to move into focus what the
Biden (Energy) Doctrine will likely look like. The first subsection will
address each of these in turn and attempt to establish what can be gleaned from
them to deduce a Biden (Energy) Doctrine. The second subsection will outline
the challenges this doctrine will face both as a matter of policy statements

29.
The Power of America’s Example: The Biden Plan for Leading the Democratic World to
Meet the Challenges of the 21st Century, BIDENHARRIS, https://joebiden.com/americanleadership/ (last
visited Jan. 15, 2021) [hereinafter Power of America].
30.
See Alex Gullén, Biden says his team has ‘no time to waste’, POLITICO (Dec. 19, 2020),
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/12/19/biden-climate-team-announcement-448717; see also Rick
Gladstone, Biden to Face Long List of Foreign Challenges, With China No.1, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/07/world/americas/Biden-foreign-policy.html.
31.
See Jennifer Epstein, Biden Offers ‘Build Back Better’ Plan to Revive Economy, BLOOMBERG
(July 9, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-07-09/biden-offers-build-back-betterapproach-to-reviving-economy.
32.

See generally Biden Build, supra note 4.

33.
See generally Build Back Better: Joe Biden’s Jobs and Economic Recovery Plan for Working
Families, BIDENHARRIS, https://joebiden.com/build-back-better/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2021) [hereinafter
Build Back Better].
34.
(Dec. 15,
biden/.

See, e.g., Will Englund et al., Biden to name Granhold as energy secretary, WASH. POST
2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/12/15/granholm-energy-secretary-
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made by the Biden administration and as a matter of the geopolitical landscape
that the Trump administration has left behind for the Biden administration.
A.

Build Back Better as an Energy Program

No slogan better captures the Biden administration’s aspirations than
“build back better.”35 This slogan can be translated into four distinct areas of
policy action under the Biden administration. The first is a renewed
commitment to emissions reduction under the Paris Agreement.36 The second
is a renewed commitment to engagement—as opposed to the unilateralism of
the Trump administration.37 Circumstances would suggest, however, that the
Biden administration will have a more pragmatic approach of incrementalism
as opposed to the attempts at concluding framework conventions that drove
part of the Obama agenda.38 Third, it is likely that the Biden administration
will seek to strengthen development aid and climate finance to support United
States energy exports while supporting global greenhouse gas mitigation
efforts.39 Finally, the Biden administration is not likely to abandon oil and gas
or move to drastic steps such as carbon border adjustments.40 Rather, it will
likely seek to bring oil and gas companies into the climate process.

1. The Paris Agreement
It is an article of faith for the Biden administration to rejoin the Paris
Agreement on January 20, 2021. Rejoining the Paris Agreement means that
the United States will continue to participate in the procedural obligations laid
out in the Paris Agreement.41 These procedural obligations chiefly concern
reporting and continued negotiation towards open items on the Paris

35.

Build Back Better, supra note 33.

36.
See Press Release, Biden Harris Transition, Statement by President-elect Joe Biden on the
Five-Year Anniversary of the Paris Agreement (Dec. 12, 2020), https://buildbackbetter.gov/pressreleases/statement-by-president-elect-joe-biden-on-the-five-year-anniversary-of-the-paris-agreement/.
37.

See Power of America, supra note 29.

See Richard A. Kessler, Pragmatic Biden has political know-how to push green agenda,
RECHARGE,
https://www.rechargenews.com/wind/pragmatic-biden-has-political-know-how-to-pushgreen-agenda/2-1-907798 (last updated Nov. 9, 2020).
38.

39.
See generally The Biden Plan for Clean Energy Revolution and Environmental Justice,
BIDENHARRIS, https://joebiden.com/climate-plan/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2021) [hereinafter Clean Energy
Revolution].
40.
See Heidi Vella, Joe Biden is president-elect: what now for US oil and gas?, OFFSHORE
TECH., https://www.offshore-technology.com/features/joe-biden-is-president-elect-what-now-for-us-oiland-gas/ (last updated Dec. 6, 2020).
41.

See DANIEL BODANSKY ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE LAW 209–26 (2017).
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Agreement agenda.42 Importantly, one such item that has yet to lead to broad
agreement concerns is carbon markets.43 The United States rejoining the Paris
Agreement will, therefore, add important information to global climate efforts
and add a voice in favor of resolving important items left open in the Paris
Agreement itself.44
However, rejoining the Paris Agreement also raises a more fundamental
question. What happens to the United States emission reduction contributions
under the Paris Agreement? The Paris Agreement does not mandate emission
reduction quotas.45 Instead, the Paris Agreement leaves it to each Member
State to make nationally determined contributions (NDCs), in which each
Member State sets out its own emission reduction targets.46 The Paris
Agreement itself does not make these NDCs binding.47 NDCs can become
binding as unilateral acts made pursuant to a treaty.48
The original United States NDC was such a binding unilateral act.49 It
was intended to create reliance interests in the States to increase the ambition
in their own emission reduction policies—and it did.50 But with the Trump
administration’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, the status of the
United States NDC has become more problematic.51
It is likely that the Biden administration will indirectly address this
uncertainty.52 Many of the United States’ Paris Agreement treaty partners

42.

Id.

See Diane Desierto, COP25 NEGOTIATIONS FAIL: CAN CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION,
ADJUDICATION, AND/OR ARBITRATION COMPEL STATES TO ACT FASTER TO IMPLEMENT CLIMATE
OBLIGATIONS?, BLOG EUR. J. INT’L L. (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.ejiltalk.org/cop25-negotiations-failcan-climate-change-litigation-adjudication-and-or-arbitration-compel-states-to-act-faster-to-implementclimate-obligations/.
43.

44.
Emma Newburger, Biden will rejoin the Paris Climate Accord. Here’s what happens next,
CNBC,
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/11/20/biden-to-rejoin-paris-climate-accord-heres-what-happensnext-.html (last updated Nov. 20, 2020).
45.

See generally Paris Agreement, supra note 20, art. 2, ¶ 1(a).

46.
Id. art. 4, ¶ 2; see also Frédéric G. Sourgens, Climate Commons Law: The Transformative
Force of the Paris Agreement, 50 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 885, 888 (2018).
47.

Paris Agreement, supra note 20, art. 4, ¶ 11.

48.

Sourgens, supra note 46, at 893.

49.

Id. at 894.

50.

Id. at 935.

51.
Press Release, Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State, On the U.S.
Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement (Nov. 4, 2019).
52.
See David Waskow et al., How Biden Can Make the US a Global Leader on Climate Action,
WORLD RES. INST. (Nov. 12, 2020), https://www.wri.org/blog/2020/11/biden-us-leadership-fight-climatechange.
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have increased their own NDCs.53 Most notably, the European Union has
announced such a plan.54 Therefore, it is likely that the United States will
announce an increase in its NDC.55
The problem with such an announcement is the manner of its
implementation. The first United States NDC was premised upon
administrative action, most notably the Clean Power Plan.56 As the Biden
administration takes office, such new administrative action will require time
both to design and shepherd through the United States administrative law
notice-and-comment process.57 It is likely that the Biden administration will
look to energy policy in order to shore up its NDC.58 But the exact nature of
this action may well be complicated by legislative agendas. This means that
there may be a lag between the United States’ expression of intention to
improve upon its NDC and its ability to actually push climate policies to
submit such an updated NDC.
It is noteworthy that this lag time may well present an opportunity. As
with the first United States NDC, the United States could use the formulation
of its own NDC as a means to coordinate with third states.59 The United States
NDC, therefore, could become a step towards building a new global energy
infrastructure.60 If the United States were to use the opportunity in this
fashion, it is likely that a second United States NDC would also become
legally binding as a unilateral act made pursuant to a treaty. As such, it would
tether the United States in a binding fashion to a forming international energy
consensus.61

53.
CAT
Climate
Target
Update
Tracker,
CLIMATE
ACTION
TRACKER,
https://climateactiontracker.org/climate-target-update-tracker (last updated Jan. 22, 2021); see generally
Paris Agreement, supra note 20.
54.
CAT Climate Target Update Tracker United Kingdom, CLIMATE ACTION TRACKER, (Dec.
12, 2020), https://climateactiontracker.org/climate-target-update-tracker/united-kingdom/.
55.

See Clean Energy Revolution, supra note 39.

56.
United States of America First NDC, U. N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE
(Mar. 9, 2016), https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/United%20States%20of
%20America%20First/U.S.A.%20First%20NDC%20Submission.pdf; JAMES E. MCCARTHY ET.AT.,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44341, EPA’S CLEAN POWER PLAN FOR EXISTING POWER PLANTS:
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 1 (2017).
57.

See 5 U.S.C. §553.

58.

See Clean Energy Revolution, supra note 39.

59.

Waskow, supra note 52.

60.

Id.

61.

Id.
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Renewed Engagement

The NDC process already hints at one of the hallmarks of what to expect
from the Biden administration. The Biden administration has vowed to reengage with the world by means of diplomacy.62 It has signaled a sharp turn
around vis-à-vis the Trump administration and its brand of unilateralism.63
As the NDC process already indicates, it is likely that this form of
engagement will follow the blueprint for the Paris Agreement NDCs. That is,
there is likely to be bilateral diplomacy to shore up support for shared energy
and climate goals with United States partners.64 One of the partners in this
respect was Canada, and this remains as such.65 Another potential partner
includes the European Union.66
The most important party for such renewed engagement is China. China
and the United States find themselves in critical opposition on security
questions that have significant implications for energy security.67 The most
important difference involves the South China Sea.68 China has advanced
significant maritime claims—claims which have been decisively rejected by
an international law of the sea tribunal.69 Despite this loss, China has moved
ahead with aggressive enforcement action in the South China Sea due to
violation of international law.70 Chinese action impairs energy security as
China is threatening natural resource exploration in the region with military
force.71 Further, the most significant shipping lanes pass through the South
China Sea,72 thus impairing freedom of navigation and global supply chains.
62.
David Sanger, The End of ‘America First’: How Biden Says He Will Re-engage With the
World, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/09/us/politics/biden-foreign-policy.html (last
updated Nov. 30, 2020).
63.

Id.

64.

ERIK BRATTBERG, REINVENTING TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS ON CLIMATE, DEMOCRACY,
for Int’l Peace) 1st ed. (2020).

AND TECHNOLOGY 1 (Carnegie Endowment

65.
Kathiann M. Kowalski, How U.S.-Canada collaboration could boost both countries’ climate
responses, ENERGY NEWS NETWORK (Mar. 27, 2019), https://energynews.us/2019/03/27/midwest/how-us-canada-collaboration-could-boost-both-countries-climate-responses/.
66.

Brattberg, supra note 64 at 1.

67.
Wu Xinbo, U.S. Security Policy in Asia: Implications for China—-U.S. Relations, 22 ISEAS
Yusof Ishak Inst. 479, 480 (2000).
68.

Pompeo, supra note 51.

69.
Diane A. Desierto, China’s Maritime Law Enforcement Activities in the South China Sea, 96
INT’L L. STUD. 257, 264 (2020).
70.

Id. at 267.

71.
Lirong Wang, Sea lanes and Chinese National Energy Security, 73 J. COASTAL RSCH. 572,
574 (2015).
72.
See How Much Trade Transits the South China Sea?, CHINAPOWER,
https://chinapower.csis.org/much-trade-transits-south-china-sea/ (last updated Jan. 25, 2021).
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The renewed engagement with China and other potential partners on
energy and climate policy is likely to be bilateral and informal. That is, the
Biden administration is unlikely to attempt the grand bargain route of a TransPacific Partnership (TPP).73 This TPP was one of the most important
documents to create a multilateral framework for deep-seated engagement on
energy trade and infrastructure, among other goals.
Had it been ratified, the TPP would have been one of the greatest United
States foreign policy successes in the region. Any multilateral treaty requires
compromise and is in many ways imperfect. But the rules laid out in the TPP
would have provided a strong framework for cooperation on energy
questions.74 It would have allowed the United States to engage China in a
multilateral framework that would have combined energy and trade-related
issues in a comprehensive manner.75
But the lesson from the TPP is that such agreements make for bad
politics.76 It is not likely that such an agreement could be ratified as a treaty
or concluded as a Congressional-Executive Agreement.77 Such far-reaching
policy proposals are unlikely to receive needed support from both the
progressive left and populist right. Consequently, diplomatic engagement
with partners is likely to increase. But, it is highly likely to be bilateral rather
than broadly multilateral. And it is more likely to be informal rather than take
the form of treaties requiring Congressional approval.

3.

Climate Finance and Development Aid

The Biden administration is committed to a program of energy
infrastructure investment.78 This commitment is most visible in its domestic
agenda.79 “Build back better” is one of the key Biden campaign slogans.80
This slogan highlights a commitment to energy infrastructure investment in

73.
James McBride et al., What Is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
REL., https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-trans-pacific-partnership-tpp (last updated Feb. 1, 2021).
74.
Michael Levi, What the TPP Means for LNG, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Nov. 17, 2015),
https://www.cfr.org/blog/what-tpp-means-lng.
75.
See Mireya Solis, The Containment Fallacy: China and the TPP, BROOKINGS (May 24,
2013), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2013/05/24/the-containment-fallacy-china-and-the-tpp/.
76.

See Frédéric G. Sourgens, Supernational Law, 50 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 155, 158 (2017).

77.
Oona Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of International Lawmaking
in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1353–54 (2008) (discussing NAFTA and other free trade
agreements).
78.

Biden Build, supra note 4.

79.

Exec. Order No. 13990, 86 Fed. Reg. 7037, 7041 (Jan. 25, 2021).

80.

Id.
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the United States domestically.81 This commitment is more likely to succeed
with Democratic legislative majorities in the U.S. House of Representatives
and the U.S. Senate.
The Biden administration’s commitment to energy infrastructure
investments does not end at the water’s edge. One of the main problems for
climate action is that many states lack the means to overhaul existing energy
infrastructure.82 This means that climate action can only be successful if states
contribute significant funds to climate finance.83
The Paris Agreement already contains a commitment for a climate
finance mechanism.84 The original goal was to raise $100 billion per year in
climate finance funding.85 This goal still falls significantly short of the
necessary resources to meet Paris’ goals. Ultimately, this goal, in turn, will
have to be increased.86
The Biden administration will likely increase its efforts in providing
climate finance to support energy infrastructure development abroad.87
Importantly, such climate finance does not require the direct use of U.S.
taxpayer dollars to build powerplants overseas.88 Rather, climate finance
relies on governments to provide guarantees for loans and assistance in
arranging commercial and multilateral financing for projects.89 Such
financing can take the form of investment insurance.90 Such action is more
likely to be politically acceptable yet still supportive of infrastructure
development overseas.

81.

Biden Build, supra note 4.

82.
DILIP AHUJA & MARIKA TATSUTANI, THE WORLD ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, SUSTAINABLE
ENERGY FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 5, 9, 35 (2008).
83.
Changing the Finance, Financing the Change, U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME,
https://www.unenvironment.org/explore-topics/climate-change/what-we-do/climate-finance (last visited
Jan. 22, 2021).
84.

Paris Agreement, supra note 20, art. 9.

85.

Jorge Gastelumendi & Inka Gnittke, Climate Finance (Article 9), in THE PARIS AGREEMENT
ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY 239, 241 (Daniel Klein et al. eds., 2017).

ON CLIMATE CHANGE:

86.
See generally Chrysa Alexandraki, COP 24 and Climate Finance: A Stepping Stone or a
Blurred Line?, EJILTALK! (Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.ejiltalk.org/cop-24-and-climate-finance-astepping-stone-or-a-blurred-line/.
87.
See Baysa Naran et al., The Biden Administration’s potential impact on climate finance,
CLIMATE POL’Y INITIATIVE (Jan. 5, 2021), https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/the-bidenadministrations-potential-impact-on-climate-finance/.
88.
See RICHARD K. LATTANZIO, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF10763, PARIS AGREEMENT: U.S.
CLIMATE FINANCE COMMITMENTS (2019) (discussing the different forms of international financial
assistance).
89.

See generally id. (detailing the manners in which the U.S. provides climate finance).

90.

Id.
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One of the reasons states offer certain forms of climate finance is because
they can further serve as export finance.91 That is, climate finance can assist
U.S. businesses in building and operating foreign energy projects.92 This
means that such foreign infrastructure has a beneficial economic impact on
the United States climate finance, which is likely an avenue of significant
United States engagement.93
On the other hand, it is not particularly likely that the United States will
enter into free trade agreements in the short term.94 The Biden administration
has already announced its intention to focus on domestic economic investment
and growth instead.95 This means that the Biden administration will likely not
expand market access systemically or otherwise expand trade and investment
protections to support energy infrastructure overhaul. At the same time, there
is no indication that the United States will exit existing U.S. free trade
agreements or investment protection treaties.96 The Biden administration is,
therefore, likely to increase support for building back better abroad. It will do
so through informal financing mechanisms and under the protection of
existing bilateral and multilateral treaties. It is not likely to retool how it
would assist in such financing and investment completely.

4.

Fossil Fuels

The Biden administration has not indicated an all-out effort to dismantle
the oil and gas industry. On the domestic front, the Biden administration has
instead attempted to follow a balancing act between environmental and energy
interests. This balancing act is most visible in the Biden campaign’s stance
on hydraulic fracturing.97 The Biden campaign has announced its intention
not to permit hydraulic fracturing on public lands.98 It has expressly rejected

91.
See Igor Shishlov, G20 Governments Must Urgently Align Their Export Credits With The
Paris Agreement, ID4D (Sept. 14, 2020), https://ideas4development.org/en/paris-agreement-role-ofexport-credits/ (for a discussion of export finance in energy).
92.
See Climate Finance, WORLD RES. INST., https://www.wri.org/our-work/project/climatefinance/climate-finance-and-private-sector (last visited Jan. 23, 2020).
93.

See generally id.

94.
See generally Tatiana L. Palermo, The future of free trade, GEOPOLITICAL INTELLIGENCE
SERV. (Oct. 23, 2020), https://www.gisreportsonline.com/the-future-of-free-trade,economy,3340.html.
95.
See Nick Allen, Joe Biden says ‘no trade deals’ until he has invested in America first,
TELEGRAPH (Dec. 3, 2020), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/12/02/joe-biden-says-no-trade-dealshas-invested-america-first/.
96.

See generally Palermo, supra note 94.

97.
Vicky B. Varela, What’s Next for Fracking Under Biden?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Dec.
18, 2020), https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/whats-next-fracking-under-biden.
98.

Id.
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banning the process on private land.99 Further, it is unclear whether the Biden
administration will not grandfather in existing producers on public lands.100
This means that the ban would only apply to new oil and gas developments on
public lands.101
This suggests that the Biden administration will also follow an
international policy that will be, on the whole, supportive of the oil and gas
industry.102 Thus, it is likely that the United States will continue to support
natural gas-fired powerplants worldwide and protect global natural gas
infrastructure.103 (Having come full circle, the United States recently sent an
aircraft carrier to Vietnam at the request of the Vietnamese government due
to Chinese threats against Vietnamese leased offshore gas projects.104 The
Biden administration will likely continue such “freedom of navigation”
diplomacy in the region, thus protecting oil and gas industry interests in the
region.)
It is unlikely that the United States would drastically alter other elements
of the international energy system. The Biden administration looks poised to
work with oil and gas as part of the energy mix.105 It is more likely that the
Biden administration would work with foreign partners on tailpipe and
smokestack technology standards.
B.

Dramatis Personae

Policy programs are only successful to the extent that they are
competently implemented. Therefore, it is important not just to look at policy
programs. The lead actors asked to implement these programs are just as
important. This section will focus on a few of the leading Biden
administration nominees that have been announced to date and assess their
impact on global energy policy.

99.

Id.

100.

Id.

101.

Id.

102.

Varela, supra note 97.

103.

Id.

104. See Reuters Staff, U.S. says completes second aircraft carrier visit to Viet., REUTERS (Mar.
11, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-vietnam-usa/u-s-says-completes-second-aircraft-carriervisit-to-vietnam-idUSKBN20Y0F3.
105. Timothy Puko, Biden’s Plan to Shift Energy Policy Faces Headwinds, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 10,
2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/bidens-plan-to-shift-energy-policy-faces-headwinds-11605016802.
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Lead Actors

The three most important persons for the Biden program are Antony
Blinken, John Kerry, and Gina McCarthy. Antony Blinken (Blinken) is
President Biden’s nominee to serve as Secretary of State.106 President Biden
has nominated John Kerry (Kerry) as special envoy for climate matter.107
Lastly, President Biden has called upon Gina McCarthy (McCarthy) to serve
as White House coordinator on climate matters.108 Each of these individuals
is likely to have a direct impact on the implementation of the energy policy
program outlined in the previous section.
Antony Blinken is a longstanding U.S. diplomat.109 Blinken first entered
government service in 1993 as the Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary
of State for European and Canadian Affairs.110 Blinken has since held national
security positions and State Department positions in the Clinton and Obama
administrations.111 Blinken has expressed strong support for increasing NDC
ambition and has called for meetings with major emitters to do so. 112 Blinken
is known as a strong internationalist.113 He is committed to multilateralist
solutions to foreign policy problems.114 Blinken has significant European
experience, having attended a high school in France, and is known as a
devotee of French culture.115 Further, he is known as a supporter of robust

106. See The Cabinet, WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/cabinet/ (last
visited Jan. 30, 2021); Lara Jakes et al., Biden Chooses Antony Blinken, Defender of Global Alliances, as
Secretary of State, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/22/us/politics/biden-antony-blinkensecretary-of-state.html (last updated Dec. 2, 2020).
107. The Cabinet, supra note 106; Lisa Friedman, With John Kerry Pick, Biden Selects a ‘Climate
Envoy’ With Stature, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/23/climate/john-kerry-climatechange.html (last visited Dec. 11, 2020).
108. Lisa Friedman, Biden to Name Gina McCarthy, Former E.P.A. Chief, as White House
Climate Coordinator, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/15/climate/ginamccarthy-biden-climate.html.
109. Deputy
Secretary
State,
U.S.
DEP’T
2017.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog/236057.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2021).
110.

Id.

111.

Id.

OF

ST.,

https://2009-

112. Tony Walker, From ‘America first’ to ‘America together’: who is Antony Blinken, Biden’s
pick for secretary of state?, CONVERSATION (Nov. 25, 2020), https://theconversation.com/from-americafirst-to-america-together-who-is-antony-blinken-bidens-pick-for-secretary-of-state-150739.
113. David M. Herszenhorn & Rym Momtaz, 9 things to know about Antony Blinken, the next US
secretary of state, POLITICO (Nov. 23, 2020), https://www.politico.eu/article/nine-things-to-think-aboutantony-blinken/.
114.

Id.

115.

Id.
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United States involvement in global security threats, including by military
force.116
John Kerry’s role as special envoy is similarly significant. The role is a
cabinet-level position.117 Kerry previously served as Secretary of State in the
Obama administration.118 In fact, the Paris Agreement was concluded during
Kerry’s tenure as Secretary of State.119 Similar to Blinken, Kerry has
significant European leanings and is known as a Francophile.120 Prior to
service as Secretary of State, Kerry served as a U.S. Senator.121 Thus, he
brings strong political experience and instincts mixed together with foreign
policy experience and weight.
Gina McCarthy will serve as the head of the White House Office of
Domestic Climate Policy.122 In this position, McCarthy will also have
significant influence over energy and climate questions within the White
House.123 McCarthy is a former Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
Administrator.124 McCarthy was one of the authors of the Clean Power
Plan.125 This plan was at the heart of the first United States NDC. Thus,
McCarthy brings significant expertise from the domestic regulatory
perspective to climate affairs.126 This expertise is particularly important as
Kerry and McCarthy are said to be friends with a history of working together
in formulating U.S. climate policy by combining regulatory and foreign policy
experience.127

116.

Id.

117. Kate Sullivan, Biden prioritizes climate crisis by naming John Kerry special envoy, CNN,
https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/23/politics/john-kerry-biden-climate-envoy/index.html (last updated Nov.
24, 2020).
118.

Id.

119.

Id.

120. AFP, John Kerry Given France's Highest Honour, LOCAL (Dec. 11, 2016),
https://www.thelocal.fr/20161211/john-kerry-given-frances-highest-honour.
121.

John Kerry, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/John_Kerry (last visited Jan. 27, 2021).

122. Juliet Eilperin & Brady Dennis, Biden Picks Former EPA Chief as White House Climate
Czar,
WASH.
POST
(Dec.
15,
2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/climateenvironment/2020/12/15/gina-mccarthy-climate-change-czar-biden/.
123.

Id.

124.

Id.

125. Coral Davenport & Lisa Friedman, Biden’s Twin Climate Chiefs, McCarthy and Kerry, Face
a Monumental Task, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/16/climate/gina-mccarthy-johnkerry-climate-adviser.html (last updated Dec. 21, 2020).
126.

Id.

127.

Id.
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Supporting Actors

Four further positions are of particular importance as the Biden team tries
to tackle the global energy trilemma. These positions are the EPA
administrator, the U.S. Trade Representative, the Secretary of Defense, and
the National Security Advisor.128 The expertise here follows the same
footsteps as the main actors as that they have significant prior experience in
their respective resorts.129
President Biden chose Michael Regan as his appointee for EPA
administrator.130 Mr. Regan has significant experience as a regulator.131 Mr.
Regan’s past work has been in air quality regulation.132 Thus, he brings
expertise in emissions regulations and climate matters to bear and therefore
assists the Kerry-McCarthy team with the implementation of climate
policies.133
President Biden named Katherine Tai as his nominee for U.S. Trade
Representative.134 The U.S. Trade Representative is charged with the
negotiation of U.S. trade agreements and sets U.S. trade policy.135 Katherine
Tai is a China expert and Mandarin speaker.136 She is expected to continue a
tough line on China in trade questions.137
On questions of energy security, the Biden administration national
security team will have an outsized importance. The main players in the
national security team are the Secretary of Defense and National Security

128. See generally NAT’L SECURITY AGENCY, https://www.nsa.gov (last visited Jan. 30, 2021);
see also Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III, U.S. DEP’T DEF., https://www.defense.gov/OurStory/Meet-the-Team/Secretary-of-Defense/ (last visited Jan.30, 2021); see also OFF. OF THE U.S. REP.,
https://ustr.gov (last visited Jan. 30, 2021); see also U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov (last
visited Jan. 30, 2021).
129. See NAT’L SECURITY AGENCY, supra note 128; see also Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin
III, supra note 128; see also OFF. OF THE U.S. REP., supra note 128.
130. See The Cabinet, supra note 106; Jeff Tollefson, Biden’s pick to head US environment agency
heartens scientists, NATURE (Dec. 18, 2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-03621-6.
131.

See Tollefson, supra note 130.

132.

Id.

133.

Id.

134. See The Cabinet, supra note 106; Yen Nee Lee, Biden’s pick for top U.S. trade official will
continue tough line on China, says ex-Trump official, CNBC (Dec. 18, 2020),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/18/bidens-ustr-pick-katherine-tai-will-be-tough-on-china-ex-trumpofficial.html.
135.

See Lee, supra note 134.

136.

Id.

137.

Id.
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advisor.138 President Biden has announced that he will nominate General
Lloyd J. Austin III as Secretary of Defense.139 Austin is a former head of U.S.
Central Command.140 His experience lies predominantly in the Middle East,
not with China or Russia. 141 Joe Biden finally chose Jake Sullivan as his
National Security Advisor.142 Sullivan, a Clinton State Department veteran
and later National Security Advisor to then-Vice President Biden, is known as
one of the architects of the Iran Nuclear Deal.143
C.

The Biden Energy Doctrine

The Obama foreign policy doctrine famously was “don’t do stupid
shit.”144 It sought to limit foreign military entanglements in Syria, much to
the dismay of many of the administration’s own veterans.145 At the same time,
the Obama administration had a desire to “go big.”146 Efforts such as the TPP
were key multilateral efforts that materially shifted U.S. foreign policy east
with a focus on Asia.147 This Asian focus was accompanied by an attempt to
cement this foreign policy in super-regional agreements that would achieve
grand policy objectives in one fell swoop.148
The Biden administration looks to follow a related but different mantra.
What emerges from both the policy proposals and cast of characters is a focus
on “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.” As this discussion has shown so far, the
Biden administration does not appear poised to propose any significant
138. See generally NAT’L SECURITY AGENCY, supra note 128; see generally Secretary of Defense
Lloyd J. Austin III, supra note 128.
139. See The Cabinet, supra note 106; Lara Seligman et al., Biden picks retired general Lloyd
Austin to run Pentagon, POLITICO, https://www.politico.com/news/2020/12/07/lloyd-austin-bidensecretary-defense-frontrunner-contender-443479 (last updated Dec. 7, 2020).
140.

See The Cabinet, supra note 106; Seligman, supra note 139.

141. Michael E. O’Hanlon et al., Around the halls: Brookings experts on defense react to the
nomination of Gen. Lloyd Austin, BROOKINGS (Dec. 10, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/orderfrom-chaos/2020/12/10/around-the-halls-brookings-experts-on-defense-react-to-the-nomination-of-genlloyd-austin/.
142. Natasha Bertrand, The inexorable rise of Jake Sullivan, POLITICO (Nov. 27, 2020),
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/11/27/jake-sullivan-biden-national-security-440814.
143.

Id.

144. Michael T. Klare, Why Hillary Clinton Is Wrong About Obama’s Foreign Policy, NATION
(Sept. 3, 2014), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/why-hillary-clinton-wrong-about-obamasforeign-policy/.
145.

Id.

146.

See, e.g., McBride et al., supra note 73.

147.

See id.

148.

See generally id.
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multilateral free trade agreements, such as the TPP, that might be able to alter
energy supply chains globally.149 Additionally, the Biden administration does
not appear to be able to invest significant funds abroad to support energy
infrastructure transformations directly. Finally, the Biden administration does
not appear to depart from existing energy security paradigms significantly.
This approach appears fundamentally consistent with the people staffed
at the top. The Biden team is highly competent. But it is also fundamentally
conservative with a little c. That is, it has a strong belief in the status quo and
in fact, seems poised to return to it rather than to build a new paradigm. This,
therefore, suggests a mentality to keep with existing approaches.
On its face, it is difficult to reconcile “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” with
“build back better.” The “better” more than implies that existing structures
are fundamentally flawed. Therefore, the idea is to improve infrastructure,
improve living conditions, build more equitable energy systems, and more
equitable economies.
In the end, the two slogans do remain fundamentally consistent with each
other. The Biden administration fundamentally believes in existing
international legal processes. The administration does not wish to change the
status because it believes that these processes are, in fact, able to deliver an
incrementally better economic and energy infrastructure.
In sum, one should expect the Biden administration to support energy
security, energy equity, and environmental sustainability within the strictures
of the Paris Agreement and classic U.S. foreign policy. One should not expect
a fundamental departure legally, even as the Biden administration will attempt
to use these existing mechanisms to different ends—namely, to strengthen
renewable energy projects in the United States and support the construction
of such projects globally.
III. THE CHALLENGE AHEAD
The Biden administration’s approach presents several challenges for
energy policy going forward. Some of these challenges are premised in
personnel. Others are premised in a structural under-ambition to resolve the
problems posed by the energy trilemma. This section will briefly address each
of these challenges in turn.
A.

The Asia Problem

One of the key problems apparent in the senior team assembled by
President Biden has been its regional focus. Antony Blinken and John Kerry

149.

See Palermo, supra note 94.
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are first and foremost European experts.150 Their focus in diplomacy and
personal experience has focused on the European continent.151
At the same time, much of the expertise of the Biden administration on
the national security side is focused on the Middle East.152 General Austin has
significant experience as head of Central Command.153 Jack Sullivan, on the
other hand, is best known for his work on the Iran Nuclear Deal.154 Their
expertise thus is focused, in particular, on one of the last theaters of United
States engagement—the Middle East.155
Today’s global energy challenges are not European. Nor do they have
their roots in the Middle East. These challenges have a significant Asian
component. The most important player in global energy systems—outside of
the United States—is China.156 Without China, it is unlikely that climate
change can be halted.157 Without China, it is very difficult for the majority of
Asia to live with energy security because China has aggressive enforcement
in the South China Sea.158 The South China Sea, of course, is both important
as a focal point for global shipping lanes and as a source of significant natural
gas reserves in the region.159
The Biden administration’s team is not attuned to the challenges of this
region. The leading China expert in the administration is the U.S. Trade
Representative Tai.160 But statements by the Biden administration have
indicated that new free trade agreements are not a priority.161 Consequently,
the skillset of the U.S. Trade Representative will not be a direct asset in
handling the difficult relationship with China and the rest of Asia.
This is not to say that the Biden administration will not be able to
overcome these challenges. It is, however, an interesting reversal of the
Obama administration’s shift to Asia. As personnel implements policy, this

150.

See generally Herszenhorn & Momtaz, supra note 113; see, e.g., AFP, supra note 120.

151.

See generally Herszenhorn & Momtaz, supra note 113; see, e.g., AFP, supra note 120.

152.

See generally Power of America, supra note 29.

153.

Seligman et al., supra note 139.

154.

See generally Bertrand, supra note 142.

155.

See generally Power of America, supra note 29.

156. See Brye Butler Steeves & Helton Ricardo Ouriques, Energy Security: China and the United
States and the Divergence in Renewable Energy, 38 CONTEXTO INTERNACIONAL 643, 643, 658 (2016).
157.

See id. at 658.

158.

Desierto, supra note 69.

159. South China Sea - what you need to know, DEUTSCHE WELLE, (Aug. 11, 2017),
https://www.dw.com/en/south-china-sea-what-you-need-to-know/a-40054470.
160.

Lee, supra note 134.

161.

Allen, supra note 95.

351926-ILSA_International_27-2_Text.indd 90

3/26/21 12:36 PM

2021]

Sourgens

313

personnel seems less able to implement Asian policy as efficiently as one
might have hoped. Thus, there are significant challenges ahead.
B.

The Trilemma Problem

The Biden administration faces a more deep-seated problem with its
energy approach in another regard. The Biden doctrine of “if ain’t broke,
don’t fix it” works at the margins. It is unlikely to solve many of the systemic
problems underlying energy transition. That is, the Biden administration has
significant ambition, but the tools it intends to use are not up to the task.
The key problem the Biden administration will face is to achieve both
domestic and global buy in for a significant ramp up in climate action.
Climate action increases energy costs.162
Increased energy costs
disproportionately impact people with less means.163 So, as a whole, it is
likely that people will protest against such climate action.164 Such protests in
France, in fact, derailed French carbon taxation plans.165 On the international
side, it is similarly difficult to convince States to increase climate ambition
without an incentive of increased development. And this increased
development hinges in large part on economic growth that typically comes
with increased free trade.
The Biden administration thus must find a tool to increase energy equity
domestically and globally. The domestic tool to address this problem appears
to be governmental energy infrastructure investment. If sufficiently
ambitious, this tool might go a long way to address the underlying equity
problem. But this is only half the battle; the same equity concern is replicated
internationally. There thus needs to be a significant increase in global
investment in energy infrastructure. Such investment only makes sense with
a ramp-up and potential overhaul of free trade agreements. That is, it seems
impossible to solve environmental sustainability and climate change without
also addressing the broader international economic order.

162. Joel Jaeger & Devashree Saha, 10 Charts Show the Economic Benefits of US Climate Action,
WORLD RES. INST. (July 28, 2020), https://www.wri.org/blog/2020/07/economic-benefits-climate-actionus.
163. See, e.g., Ariel Drehobl, Low-Income Households Pay More for Energy, but Efficiency Can
Help, U.S. NEWS (Sept. 30, 2021), https://www.usnews.com/news/healthiest-communities/articles/202009-30/poor-households-pay-more-for-energy-but-efficiency-can-help.
164. See Somini Sengupta, Protesting Climate Change, Young People Take to Streets in a Global
Strike, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/20/climate/global-climate-strike.htm (last updated
Sept. 21, 2019).
165. Bate Felix, France’s Macron learns the hard way: green taxes carry political risks, REUTERS
(Dec. 2, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-climate-change-france-protests/frances-macron-learnsthe-hard-way-green-taxes-carry-political-risks-idUSKBN1O10AQ.
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The Biden administration further does not seem to have a clear plan to
address energy security. Currently, Chinese activity in the South China Seas
negatively affects energy security for the reasons outlined above. However,
China is also a key state in building an environmental coalition sufficient to
halt and turn back climate change.166 Here, energy security and environmental
sustainability appear at loggerheads with each other.
The Biden
administration appears to be focused on climate policy. But this focus is
always a hostage of security concerns. So far, the Biden administration has
not developed a plan for how to address this tension.
In other words, part of the problem of “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” is
that the Biden administration appears to be too pragmatic to achieve its own
climate ends. A greater focus on the “build back better” prong of its approach
would likely require a deeper investment in international economic law by the
United States. It requires a commitment to grow energy infrastructures
globally. But such a commitment is only realistic if the Biden administration
changes its priorities on free trade agreements. To build back better, and to
meet climate change, is trade policy. It is not just environmental or foreign
policy. This reality so far appears to be missing from the Biden
administration’s overall more cautious approach.

166.

See Steeves & Ouriques, supra note 156, at 658.
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